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ABSTRACT
A NONLINEAR DYNAMIC METHOD FOR SUPPORTING LARGE-SCALE 
DECISION MAKING IN UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENTS
Wayne Woodhams 
Old Dominion University 
Director: Dr. Laurence D. Richards
This research developed a methodology for supporting decision making 
by reducing uncertainty in decision environments which are too large, dynamic 
and complex to be treated by traditional quantitative and simulation techniques. 
These environments are complex because of the free choice associated with 
human involvement, and the existence of a large number of interrelated factors 
which influence the outcomes of the decision process. They are dynamic 
because the ground rules affecting those interrelationships are constantly 
changing. Uncertainty cannot be treated probabilistically, since identification of 
a full set of outcomes and factors of influence is not possible.
The venue for the investigation was the infrastructure which supports 
commercial space launch activities in the United States. The issue treated was 
whether it would be advisable to make large capital investment in that 
infrastructure.
The problem was approached using the principles of Chaos Theory and 
Nonlinear Dynamics, in a manner similar to that used by Priesmeyer (1992).
The intent was to engender a more systemic view of the environment and
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approach analysis by examining marginal changes, over a period of ten years, 
in factors which tend to influence the outcome. The objective was to develop 
hypotheses which, when validated, will provide a new perspective for decision 
makers from which to enhance the robustness of these kinds of decisions.
The methodology, which evolved over several years of preliminary 
research, involved identification of sectors of the commercial space 
infrastructure, isolation of the more important decision factors, identification and 
solicitation of knowledgeable respondents from the various infrastructure 
sectors, development of a computerized qualitative data gathering instrument, 
and graphical analysis of data represented by phase plane diagrams. Although 
there was little evidence of “classical” chaotic behavior in the data, the analysis 
was able to isolate those nonlinear dynamic relationships between decision 
factors which appeared most likely to provide information regarding system 
behavior. One hypothesis was developed directly from that observation. A 
second resulted from the development of an aggregate measure of the level of 
uncertainty (and, consequently, investment risk) inherent in the decision 
environment.
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Most large-scale decision making is done in a dynamic, highly complex 
environment. For purposes of this research, “large-scale” decision making is 
defined as that which:
• involves commitment of large sums of money (on the order of 
millions of dollars) and/or similarly valued assets;
•  is performed in an environment which extends beyond the 
decision maker’s own organization and over which she or he 
has little or no control; and
•  attempts to influence outcomes which take a significant amount 
of time (perhaps decades) to fully manifest themselves.
The environment is characterized as “dynamic” because the forces and
relationships which affect the decision and its outcomes are constantly
changing. Being populated and influenced primarily by humans and their
interactions, it is also characterized by nonlinear relationships and a high degree
of uncertainty regarding the future. The number of factors is too great, and the
interactions too complex, to allow analysis and comprehension through any kind
of linear approach.
1
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Ashby (1956), in discussing the Law of Requisite Variety contends that, in 
order to fully regulate a system, the regulator must have at least as much variety 
as that system. In terms of decision making, that could be restated as, "In order 
to make a decision which guarantees an optimal outcome, the decision maker 
must have at least the variety presented by the environment in which the 
decision is to be made." Since this is obviously not possible, in order to make 
some sensible decisions, ways must be found to reduce the variety in the 
environment, increase the variety of the decision maker or, preferably, both.
Eoyang (1978) discusses these issues in terms of organizations coping 
with unpredictable environments. He notes that organizations tend to try to 
increase their variety to match that of the environment by organizing with greater 
structural differentiation, more elaborate integration and more decentralized 
conflict management. He goes on to say that organizations try to reduce the 
variety in the environment by exercising some control over it through proactive 
interaction (forming cartels, selection of board members, developing long-term 
supply contracts, etc.). He suggests that a third method of reducing variety in 
the environment is consistent with Ashby's work, that is, to reduce the variety of 
potential outcomes of actions by adjusting goals.
But what can be said about the decision maker who needs to decide 
whether or not to commit substantial amounts of resources in a market whose 
complex, nonlinear and dynamic characteristics create the kind of uncertainty in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3
which probabilistic methods of analysis do not apply, because, at a given 
decision point, there exists neither a closed set of known potential outcomes, nor 
a quantifiable set of variables and relationships? This kind of uncertainty has 
been termed “primary uncertainty.”
Some ways of dealing with the variety of the decision maker, including 
“robust" decision making (Gupta and Rosenhead, 1968, and Rosenhead, Elton 
and Gupta, 1972) have been addressed. Adjustment of goals and objectives 
through “satisficing” techniques has also been addressed (March and Simon,
1958). An area that remains for investigation is how to reduce (or at least find a 
way of coping with) the variety imposed on the decision maker by the 
environment.
Venue of Investigation 
The chosen setting for the research has current relevance in the 
technological business community. Over the past four decades, exploration and 
exploitation of space has become a significant contributor to humankind’s 
scientific and technological knowledge. Only recently, by comparison, has some 
of the commercial potential of space been exploited. Thus far, the only 
spaceborne commodity which has proven commercially viable is information and 
communication. The reason is that the cost of access to space is still prohibitive 
for most other kinds of activities. The question, then, which provides the venue
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
for this research is: “Should an investment be made to develop the 
infrastructure to support commercial space launch activities?” It is easily seen 
that there are various technological, political, market, financial and other factors 
which will influence the viability of such ventures. Middleton (1995) contends 
that the track record of space launch market predictions is not very good, and 
that it would be prudent for investors to seek advice from a wide range of 
sources regarding assessment of factors capable of influencing market growth. 
Most of these factors, however, are not directly measurable: they interact in 
complex, nonlinear ways, and they are not predictable over the timeframe 
required to establish the vehicles and infrastructure to provide cost effective 
space access.
Purpose of the Research 
The purpose of the research is to add to the body of knowledge and 
supporting tools for strategic decision making, policy formulation and forecasting 
in the kinds of environments characterized herein. Toward this purpose, the 
investigation will employ qualitative data gathering methods and an analysis 
based on the principles of nonlinear dynamics and chaos theory to investigate 
the complex macroscopic relationships between factors which affect the viability 
of investments in commercial space infrastructure.
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The research is investigative in nature, and not intended to stand as proof 
of a given hypothesis. It is an examination of the data of a sample study, with 
the intent of generating hypotheses regarding the utility of the methodology to 
provide meaningful information to decision makers.
The methodology and hypotheses are generalizable to a broad range of 
decision environments which embody the complexity and dynamic 
interrelationships characteristic of the environment examined herein. One such 
scenario might be the strategic decision by an automobile manufacturer 
regarding development of an “alternatively powered" vehicle. It contains many 
of the same kind of uncertain elements: emerging (and currently unknown) 
technologies, dependence on government regulation, influence of public opinion, 
level of competition and others.
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CHAPTER 2
UNDERLYING THEORY OF RESEARCH (LITERATURE REVIEW)
The objective of this research is to examine a new methodology for 
supporting large-scale strategic decision making in environments characterized 
by nonlinear relationships of variables and primary uncertainty. Primary 
uncertainty, which will be discussed in greater detail subsequently, can be 
operationally defined as that situation in which probabilistic methods of analysis 
do not apply because, at a given decision point, there exists neither a closed 
set of known potential outcomes, nor a quantifiable set of interactions and 
relationships between variables. As stated by Mendell (1985), all systems of 
interest are open systems, susceptible to invasion by outside forces which 
cannot be identified until they affect the system. Those forces are the “unk- 
unks” (unknown unknowns).
The underlying theory comes from three domains. First, of course, is the 
theory that supports strategic decision making itself, and particularly that which 
deals with non-probabilistic decisions. Secondly, since strategic decision 
making involves some attempt at adapting to an uncertain future, there is also an 
element of (long-range) forecasting, with its associated grounding theory.
6
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Thirdly, this research attempts to deal with the complex, dynamic, nonlinear 
relationships by applying analytical techniques derived from chaos theory. The 
theoretical perspective of the research emerges from these domains as shown in 
Figure 2-1.
Strategic Decision Theory and Policy Formulation 
Thompson and Strickland (1981) define organizational strategy and policy as 
activities associated with giving the organization purposeful direction toward 
stated goals and objectives, and allocating resources toward that end. As 
described in Chapter 1, the venue of this research involves a strategic decision 
regarding allocation of resources to develop space launch infrastructure, as 
opposed to some other venture. This specific scenario is clearly a subset of the 
general definition given by Thompson and Strickland. Entities interested in the 
outcome of the research would include commercial companies seeking 
increased profits and/or market share, and government agencies seeking to 
stimulate economic development.
It can be said that all decisions of any consequence made by 
organizations involve some degree of uncertainty regarding the future. 
Uncertainty, however, has always posed a problem for decision makers. Gul 
and Lantto (1990) have stated:
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. . . .  it is unlikely that any theory of choice under uncertainty which 
is consistent with what an economist might consider rational 
behavior will be capable of accommodating all observed behavior 
in actual choice situations, nor is it clear that a purely descriptive 
theory...will add substantially to our understanding of choice under 
uncertainty. (Gul and Lantto 1990, 173)
Aiginger (1987) does not treat “uncertainty proper” (i.e., no probability function
can be formed regarding the variable of interest). He differentiates between risk
and uncertainty proper, the former being where probabilities can be estimated.
He contends that:
As a consequence of uncertainty proper, agents regress to simple 
rule of thumb or convention, they behave in a conservative way 
reacting only to dramatic changes in the environment. (Aiginger 
1987, 31)
The views of Gul, Lantto and Aiginger notwithstanding, the literature 
describes many tactics for dealing with uncertainty, but all make assumptions 
regarding the bounds of the uncertainty: that is, they either ignore what is 
admittedly unknowable or lump unknowables in with known factors. The majority 
of decision methodologies (Clemen (1991), Dyckman et al. (1969), Hill et al. 
(1979), Newbold (1986), Radford (1981), Easton (1980), Jedamus and Frame 
(1969), Holloway (1979) and many others) involve some kind of probability 
model, whether it be subjective (Savage, 1954), Bayesian or based on statistical 
probability distributions (Binomial, Poisson, Exponential, Normal, Beta, Bernoulli, 
Geometric, Multinomial, and others).
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Much of decision theory in light of uncertainty has revolved around the 
concept of Expected Utility (Stigler, 1950; Allais and Hagen, 1979; Machina, 
1982; Fishburn, 1970,1982; Schniedler, 1989; and Prelecand Loewenstein, 
1991). But this framework, as well, requires assignment of probabilities for 
decision variables. Other theories, including prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979) and regret theory (Loomes and Sudgen, 1982) also require 
assignment of probabilities to variables or states of nature. Kami (1985) also 
describes decision making under uncertainty in terms of the basic notions of 
states of nature, acts, and consequences; the states of nature being governed 
by either objectively or subjectively determined probabilities.
Many of these same authors discuss expected value, risk profiles, 
dominance criteria, sensitivity analysis and the maximin, maximax and rationality 
rules for choosing (acting, in Kami’s terminology) among alternative strategies, 
but these rely on a knowledge of (or at least a guess at) the full set of possible 
states of nature, and/or estimation of probabilities for those states. To further 
complicate the issue, research by Bolger and Wright (1993) suggests that the 
validity of probability judgments made by “domain experts” to support decisions 
of this kind is suspect.
Some recent research examines new ways to support decision making. 
Mehrez et al. (1995) propose that a powerful approach for describing systems 
that are concurrent, parallel, asynchronous, distributed and non-deterministic
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
involves representation using Petri Nets, which serve as meta-models for 
complex decision problems. Petri Nets can replace decision trees, with the 
advantages of providing some computational utility and the ability to represent 
situations under certainty and (probabilistic) uncertainty. Dagsvik (1994) has 
developed a method for generating choice probabilities for consumer demand 
(states of nature) based on the stochastic properties of the demand function and 
“consumption bundle vectors” of attributes of the decision outcomes.
Some attempts have been made to address the uncertainty issue via 
specialized computer software. Cohen (1985) developed an expert system shell 
called SOLOMON which employs a system of endorsements to reinforce or 
refute uncertain propositions. The results, however, are difficult to interpret and 
the propositions difficult to rank. Henrion, Morgan, Nair and Wiecha (1986) 
developed a computer model called Demos which was intended to aid policy 
analysts in handling uncertainty and risk. But a criterion of its design was that 
uncertain values be represented as probability distributions.
There has been research and methodologies have been proposed to 
support decision making without the use of probabilities. Kelsey (1993) 
discusses a method which can be used under partial uncertainty by a decision 
maker who does not have the luxury of waiting for complete information. He 
derives an ordinal scaling scheme for ranking potential states of nature in terms 
of their likelihood of occurrence. The decision maker then would choose the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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action with the best payoff assuming that the most likely state of nature will 
occur.
Beenhakker (1975) suggested a form of sensitivity analysis that entailed 
making some contingency assumptions (based on the assumption that you must 
have some idea of what might happen) at the outset of strategic planning. 
However, he makes no provision to do any sequential planning, relating all 
contingencies back to time zero. Yager (1980) developed a “theory of 
possibility” based on fuzzy set theory, which was used by Tonn (1986,1991) in 
his research regarding environmental policy decisions. Tonn observed that 
there were many instances in long range planning in which even subjective 
probabilities could not be generated. His model involved development of a 
“possibility function" which described all possible future worlds so that policy 
analysts and planners could plan to eliminate those undesirable outcomes, and 
let society chart a more desirable, but unspecified course. Similarly, Mason and 
Wilson (1987) propose that a process they term “future mapping” be used to 
develop desirable end states - possibilities, not forecasts - and “event streams” 
that identify what must happen along the way for them to get there. Then as 
each milepost (decision point) is reached, the organization will know what action 
will lead them toward one of the desirable end states. These models are 
developed in brainstorming meetings and use matrices as visual displays.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Others, including Cohen and Jaffrey (1980) and Arrow and Hurwicz 
(1972) have looked at decision making under what they term “complete 
ignorance,” meaning that the decision maker has no knowledge of how the 
states of nature might influence the outcomes of actions taken. Cohen and 
Jaffrey establish a set of axioms which define decision criteria without ascribing 
probabilities to events. The method does, however, rely on the definition of a 
complete set of events and outcomes, and bases decisions on comparison 
between “extremal values” of acts. Arrow and Hurwicz do not presuppose a 
fixed set of states of nature, posing the problem as a choice of action from a 
given set, when the consequences of such action are functions of an unknown 
state of nature.
One element of the decision environment examined herein that none of 
the previously cited authors address is its dynamic nature: the fact that it can 
change during the decision process. Hey (1993) performed research in which a 
dynamic simulation with live subjects proved that few were capable of making 
optimal decisions in a dynamic environment with only three variables changing. 
He concludes that much of the lack of predictability in real-life markets results 
from sub-optimal decisions made by those who assume that the environment is 
predictable. The literature failed to reveal any research into the use of chaos 
theory and/or nonlinear dynamics principles to address decision making issues, 
other than Priesmeyer’s work which is discussed below.
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Robust (Investment) Decision Theory
Wittrock (1979) describes planning at the policy level as follows:
(It) involves the systematic preparation of decisions that may have 
long term consequences, and the aim of this activity is not the 
specification of future commitments, but to guarantee that policy 
makers will in the future have as wide a range of options open as 
possible. (Wittrock 1979, 268)
In two papers, Gupta and Rosenhead (1968) and Rosenhead, Elton and 
Gupta (1972) contend that uncertainty in strategic planning and investment 
strategy is characterized by those situations “...in which it is impossible to 
attribute probabilities to the possible outcomes of any decision” (1972, p. 416). 
They treat a special class of problem in which unpredictable future events may 
influence the outcomes of sequential investment decisions, using a plant 
location problem with an unpredictable product demand as an illustration. They 
introduce the concepts of robustness and stability as measures, at any given 
decision point in the planning period, of flexibility of the strategic plan to provide 
a “good” (not optimal) result in light of future uncertainty. They accomplish this 
by employing the technique of satisficing (March and Simon, 1958), which keeps 
in consideration all possible end states for which the expected results exceed a 
specified minimum. An element that they incorporate is that of time - in a sense 
other than determination of net present value or discounted utility (Prelec and 
Loewenstein, 1991). The element of time brings into focus the possibility of an 
environment which changes throughout the planning cycle. Over long planning
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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periods, a stab at gauging the effect of a series of unpredictable future events at 
the outset is almost always in error.
The Gupta and Rosenhead formulation provides a good basis to begin to 
look at problems of this nature. There are, however, some significant 
differences between the simple plant location/distribution problem used as an 
example in both of their papers, and the complex issues involved in developing 
space launch infrastructure. The major difference is that in the plant location 
problem there is only one uncertain variable (demand) and its effects on the 
system are straightforward and easily determined. The decision is one 
dimensional: whether or not to construct the next plant, and if so, where. 
Uncertainty in the launch infrastructure problem manifests itself in many 
variables which interact in ways which are anything but straightforward.
Another difference is that there is residual value in the system of production 
plants at any time in the future, even if it should be decided not to implement any 
further development. The system exhibits “stability.” For launch infrastructure 
development, on the other hand, unforeseen events could conceivably render 
partially completed capital assets (and those decisions made to create them) 
valueless. The current state of the U.S. Space Station Freedom program 
(Lawler, 1993) provides a vivid example of this situation. Even though little 
hardware was produced, the changes in government policy regarding funding
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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and mission relegated much of the investment in scrapped designs to be 
considered as sunk costs, with little residual value.
These particular authors (Gupta, et al.) seem to have foregone any further 
investigation along these lines. No further discussion is evident in any available 
subsequent literature. Others (Friend and Jessop, 1977) have used the analysis 
of robustness of “action sets” as a method of selecting immediate commitments 
in the continuing process of suburban planning. Dixit and Pindyck (1995) 
discuss these same issues, likening the capital investment decision to financial 
call options, providing the decision maker the right, but not the obligation to 
purchase an asset at some future time. They go on to say, as do the others, that 
keeping one’s options open is the best hedge against uncertainty. These 
writings have not, however, added anything of significance to the theory 
supporting decision making of the nature investigated herein.
Forecasting
Whenever a decision must be made, the consequences of which are 
dependent on future events which cannot be responded to rapidly, it is implied 
that some kind of forecasting must be done. It is obvious that forecasting is a 
constituent element of the research performed herein. Allaire and Firsirotu 
(1989) have said that, for organizations, predicting the future is essential but not 
sufficient, because of the inherent uncertainty. Rather, organizations should
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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attempt to proactively shape the future environment (a “power response") and 
build adaptiveness into their structures.
There is a great deal of literature regarding various theories and 
methodologies for forecasting, almost all of which, according to Armstrong 
(1985), has been generated since 1960. The field can be narrowed somewhat 
for this research because of the type of decision environment considered (long- 
range, large-scale investment decisions in complex, nonlinear environment with 
primary uncertainty relating to the decision variables).
The difficulty in forecasting varies directly with the range of the forecast 
and the number and unpredictability of the factors which influence the decision. 
Armstrong (1985) defines long range as the length of time in which large 
changes in the environment may occur. Wittrock (1979) contends that in 
forecasting, “long range” implies that commitments and restrictions which apply 
in the present will not necessarily apply over the forecast time span. 
Relationships between the basic variables which determine current system 
behavior may not remain the same. In environments similar to those under 
examination herein, it is this inability to extrapolate the relationships among 
variables over lengthy time periods, or even to quantify them in the present, 
which has made forecasting a difficult and imprecise undertaking. Given that 
this research deals with programs that could take up to twenty years to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
18
implement, and that in this amount of time significant environmental changes can 
occur, treating the forecasting elements as “long range” is appropriate.
Wittrock goes on to say that in cross-sectoral and cross-disciplinary long 
range forecasting, which are also characteristic of the environment under 
consideration, alternatives cannot be assigned numerical probabilities. Handling 
of this kind of uncertainty by planning and policy making organized by industrial 
sector will not encounter a great degree of success. Armstrong and Raiffa 
(1968) contend that when there is a high degree of uncertainty and aggregation 
required for prediction, the ability to forecast is enhanced by decomposing the 
issue into more manageable subsets.
Armstrong believes that an "eclectic” approach (use of several 
instruments and techniques to approach the problem from different perspectives) 
is best when dealing with high uncertainty and “fuzzy” parameters which defy 
measurement. He presents a taxonomy of forecasting methodologies which is 
shown here as Figure 2-2.
Of interest here is the differentiation between the “naive” and “causal" 
methodologies of forecasting. Naive methods simply trace the changes, over 
time, in the variable to be forecast. Causal methods, on the other hand, 
investigate the causal relationships between the forecast variable and other 
variables/factors which influence it in some fashion.

























Figure 2-2. Taxonomy of Forecasting Methodologies (Armstrong )
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Also of interest is the differentiation between “subjective” and “objective” 
methodologies. The critical difference is that the objective methods rely more on 
hard data and are, for the most part, experimentally repeatable, while the 
subjective methods, although often supported by objective data, are cognitive 
and heuristic in nature, usually varying between forecasters.
Perhaps the most popular of the subjective methodologies is scenario 
building, in which alternative futures are generated under various assumptions 
about intervening events. Armstrong does not recommend scenarios as a way 
to improve forecast accuracy, but does see them as useful in helping people to 
confront unpleasant forecasts. Others (Mendeli, 1985, Ascher and Overholt, 
1983) see scenario building as the most useful non-extrapolative methodology. 
Mendeli feels that the most useful outcome of this kind of exercise is that it 
enriches the supply of ideas about the future.
Ascher and Overholt feel that whenever there is a richness of interaction, 
contextual and scenario analyses are the methodologies of choice. If a strategy 
is designed for each potential environment, then the policy maker can quickly 
shift in response to changes in the environment. They also contend that there is 
a “core environment” which is unlikely to change regardless of future events.
One scenario approach which Armstrong supports as a way to help 
forecasters free themselves of constraints is to envision living in an “ideal” 
future, and looking back to construct the series of events which transpired to
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make it so. Priesmeyer (1992) describes this as “visioning.” Ascher and 
Overholt refer to it as “reverse scenario building.” Mendeli calls it “future 
backward” scenario generation. The shortcoming of this approach, of course, is 
that it assumes that the forecasting entity can, in some measure, influence all of 
the environmental factors which determine its future.
Chaos Theory and Nonlinear Dynamics 
Chaos Theory was popularized in the scientific community by Ilya 
Prigogine (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984), James Gleick (1988) and others, and 
to the general public by Michael Crichton (1990). One of the basic premises, as 
discussed by Prigogine and Gleick, is that systems whose behavior appears to 
be unpredictable or chaotic at one level of investigation may conform to certain 
behavioral constraints when viewed from a different level. These constraints, or 
“attractors,” confine the possible excursions of the system’s behavior to an 
observable state space, and add an element of predictability to that behavior. It 
is this element of Chaos Theory which is generic to the analysis and results of 
the research described herein. Another important characteristic of chaotic 
systems is their sensitivity to initial conditions: the state of the system at any 
given time in the future can vary drastically with minute differences in the initial 
values of parameters. While the system may be predictable over a short time 
period, longer term predictability (of exactly which state the system will be in at a 
given time) is not possible. Also noted by these researchers is that chaotic
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systems are not random. It would not be possible to extract any information from 
a system which behaves randomly. The only predictability regarding its state at 
a given time in the future would be that it could assume any of its possible states 
(the number of which, in a complex system, is very large and probably unknown) 
with equal probability.
Several researchers have used chaos and nonlinear dynamics 
approaches as a framework for discussing and investigating economic and 
organizational phenomena and practices. At a broad macroscopic level, Bullard 
and Butler (1993) discuss the possibility that economic time series are 
characterized by chaotic dynamics, and that linear frameworks of analysis can 
lead to erroneous policy inferences. Nonlinear dynamics gives economists a 
way to look at systems in which the steady state is unstable, but constrained in 
some way to a periodicity, or at least bounded by some attractor. They conclude 
that strange attractors, although difficult to identify without large sample sizes, 
might be exploited by economists in some situations. They report, however, that 
the theory and methodologies of nonlinear dynamics had not, at the time of their 
writing, caused any changes in economic policy development. The same 
general conclusion was reached by Sayers (1991); that is, that nonlinear 
structures are observable in financial and economic time series, but their 
importance in modeling, forecasting and policy formulation is yet to be 
determined.
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Smilor and Feeser (1991) have attempted to analyze the entrepreneurial 
process of starting up a technology enterprise, using chaos theory as a 
framework. Their contention is that the process is turbulent (chaotic) and highly 
sensitive to the initial conditions in the availability and quality of talent, 
technology, capital and know-how. Chaos theory, then, helps to explain the 
nature of the risk involved in entrepreneurial ventures, and provides a framework 
for further research.
Cartwright (1991) uses chaos theory as a framework to discuss planning 
in unpredictable environments. The systems are considered chaotic because of 
the element of free will, which renders planning based on prediction illogical.
The implication of this with respect to planning is that planners must work with 
an “ensemble” of forecasts, since any imprecision in measurement of initial 
(current) conditions, even if the parametric relationships of the predictive model 
are accurate, will result in a broad range of potential “futures.” Planners must 
learn to work with models that exhibit this kind of behavior, and not fear reliance 
on simple models of complex behavior. He contends further that since chaotic 
systems are relatively predictable on a short-term basis, it justifies planning 
strategies that are incremental and adaptive, rather than comprehensive. Very 
little empirical work has been accomplished, however, with respect to this 
theoretical approach to planning.
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Relating to strategic development of organizations, Stacey (1993) 
maintains that managers cannot mandate the long-term direction of their 
organizations because the nonlinear dynamic feedback of human interactions is 
unpredictable. Alternatively, what they should do is to create the unstable 
conditions that allow organizations to redefine themselves in new strategic 
directions. These strategies emerge spontaneously from chaos through real­
time learning and self organizing. Decision making then becomes an exploratory 
process based on reasoning and analogy rather than analysis of hard data.
Richards (1990) presents some empirical evidence that political strategic 
decision making can exhibit chaotic behavior, but acknowledges that to identify 
chaotic behavior in this arena requires representation of decision making in a 
quantitative schema, and also requires a lengthy series of precise data, neither 
of which is easily obtained. From her example of crisis decision making, she 
concludes that while specific outcomes are impossible to predict, boundaries 
can be established which surround the set of possible outcomes.
Priesmeyer (1992) and Priesmeyer and Baik (1989) discuss some 
practical ways of examining complex organizational relationships using marginal 
performance data and the analysis techniques generic to nonlinear dynamics 
and chaos theory. The premise is that much of the complex behavior exhibited 
by organizations emerges from deterministic processes, and that some of the 
complexity can be stripped away by using those techniques and methods of
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observation. Two of the characteristics of chaotic systems mentioned earlier 
(constraint imposed by attractors and sensitivity to initial conditions) are central 
to this analysis methodology, which seeks to reduce the variety in the 
environment by being able to understand what the system cannot do (or at least 
is unlikely to do).
Priesmeyer discusses application of this methodology based on chaos 
theory to forecasting and decision making in the business environment. He uses 
readily accessible and measurable historical business data such as sales 
volume and profit as the observed parameters. From this data, he creates 
trajectories in phase planes, which define the domains of system behavior. Each 
axis of a phase plane represents changes in one of the parameters over a unit of 
time. Analysis of these trajectories provides information regarding repeatability 
and/or domains of the dynamic relationships between the observed parameters.
In Priesmeyer’s framework, forecasting is discussed as “visioning,” which 
is similar in purpose to scenario building. The forecaster traces the trajectory of 
the selected performance parameters throughout recent history and “selects” a 
desired and reasonably attainable future trajectory. Then the business, 
assuming that it has some control over its environment, takes such actions 
deemed necessary to enable the envisioned future.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
26
Departure From Existing Theory 
Chaos theory and nonlinear dynamics approaches to forecasting and 
decision making, as presented by Priesmeyer, have been based on analysis of 
two variable systems using quantitative data from individual organizations. The 
decision environment to be examined herein is not well bounded (like an 
organization) and has many factors which all interact dynamically in ways which 
are impossible to fully understand and predict. Further, due to the size and 
complexity of the decision environment, identification of the complete set of 
factors capable of affecting the decision environment is difficult, if not 
impossible. The factors are largely qualitative in nature, with little statistical data 
available. What sets this research apart from prior applications of chaos theory 
and nonlinear dynamics to forecasting and decision making problems, then, is 
that it will deal with multivariate systems, using qualitative data as input.
In terms of Armstrong’s taxonomy of forecasting methodologies (Figure 
2-2), the methodology developed herein is a new approach in which the process 
is largely objective, but has a distinct judgmental element. The method is 
primarily causal in that it bases its predictive power on the dynamic relationships 
between variables. It does not fit in either the linear or classification model, but 
stands on its own. A modified Figure 2-2 appears as Figure 2-3.
































Data which supports this research was collected over a period of three 
years. For the first two of those years, data was obtained via literature review 
and informal contact with people functioning in the selected “environment” (the 
business of accessing space). This process served to define that environment 
in terms of its key participant groups and factors that affect the decision process 
investigated herein. This information was used as a basis for developing the 
formal data gathering instrument and identifying potential respondents. The 
reliability and validity of these data are established mainly through the 
multiplicity of sources from which they were obtained, and the general 
consensus on those data elements to be identified in subsequent paragraphs, 
which were used in the investigation.
The Center for Commercial Space Infrastructure (CCSI) was established 
within the Department of Engineering Management at Old Dominion University in 
March of 1992. Its stated objective was to foster, through research,
28
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development and education, the growth of those technological systems and 
organizational entities required for commercial space activities. As Assistant 
Director of CCSI, the thrust of the researcher’s activities for the first two years 
involved definition of the organizational elements of the infrastructure which 
supports access to space, and gaining entry into those organizations to develop 
funded research opportunities. Bootstrapping this operation involved content 
analysis of publications and documents, and personal contact by phone and/or 
mail with functionaries in industry, government and academia. Appendix A 
contains a partial listing of the literature reviewed and contacts established as 
a part of this effort.
Subsequent to that period of bootstrapping, the efforts of the Center were 
concentrated on establishing the physical assets and management interfaces 
required to support viable commercial space launch operations at the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Wallops Flight Facility at Wallops 
Island, Virginia. These activities provided the background, much of the specific 
data and the personal contacts necessary to accomplish this research. The 
industry and government policy makers involved have been grappling with the 
kind of decision that is being investigated herein.
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Theoretical/Conceptual Framework of the Research 
The primary purpose of this research is to introduce and investigate an 
alternative way of viewing and developing planning strategies in an environment 
of economic, technological and political uncertainty. It is intended to contribute 
to knowledge and theory in the area of sociotechnical decision making and 
policy formulation in any endeavor that involves commitment of resources, over 
long periods, in unpredictable environments.
Due to the nature of the problem, the research will embody the 
methodology of Qualitative Inquiry (Patton, 1990). There are several aspects of 
the research which support this approach. It is basically a process study, 
seeking to understand and improve the processes of planning and decision 
making. It involves futuring applications - forecasting and construction of 
scenarios as predictive tools. It is, to a great extent, exploratory in nature, and 
the literature review failed to identify any acceptable, valid, reliable quantitative 
measures or methods that could address the issues at hand. The data required 
are of a highly subjective nature and not readily quantifiable. While ordinal 
scaling is performed and the data are mathematically manipulated, the 
numbers generated are symbolic and merely facilitate the acquisition and 
presentation of data, rather than their analysis or implementation. The primary 
data gathering instrument elicits qualitative responses to specific issues, for 
most of which there exists no hard data.
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The research is characterized as Exploratory Applied Research. It is 
Applied Research, since it seeks to "inform action, enhance decision making, 
and apply knowledge to solve human and societal problems" (Patton, 1990, p. 
12). Applied research takes the findings of basic research and applies them to 
real-world problems, which is exactly the intent of this research. It is exploratory 
because it seeks to generate hypotheses regarding the predictability of 
behavior of highly complex sociotechnical systems in uncertain environments, 
and identify the direction(s) in which continued research might proceed. The 
environment under consideration is characterized by emerging technology and 
(relatively) rapid changes in the economic and political environment. The 
techniques investigated herein are intended to support decisions and policy 
formulation, the ramifications of which will not be fully realized for several years. 
There is, therefore, no practical way to “test” the validity of these measures by 
monitoring results.
The theoretical perspective of the research is grounded in systems 
theory, which seeks to determine why a system as a whole behaves as it does, 
and in the nonlinear dynamics elements of chaos theory. In order to attempt to 
reconcile some of the uncertainty in the decision process, the policy maker and 
the environment in which the resultant policy decisions play out must be 
considered as a system with highly complex and nonlinear interactions.
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Identification of Sectors of the Environment 
In order to investigate the dynamic relationships in a system, it is first 
necessary to define the boundaries of that system. The system has been 
defined so far as including the decision/policy maker and the “environment” in 
which the decisions must play out. Identification of the components, or sectors, 
of that environment is necessary not only to bound the system under 
consideration, but also to provide a framework for selection of potential 
respondents for data collection.
The system has previously been described in another way: as the 
infrastructure which supports commercial space launches. The documentation 
and personal contacts listed in Appendix A provided the data used to develop 
Figure 3-1. Each major branch of the diagram is operationally defined as a 
sector of the environment for this research. In a more general sense, a sector of 
the environment is operationally defined as a group of people or organizations 
representing a specific discipline, industry component or public agency type 
which, by some current or future action (or lack thereof) of its constituents, can 
influence the outcome of strategic decisions. The sectors identified for this 
research are discussed briefly in the following paragraphs.
NASA performs or directly funds a large portion of the research and 
development regarding space transportation. They also are responsible for





























Figure 3-1. Sectors of the Environment
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developing many scientific satellites and payloads. But most importantly, NASA 
is a key player in the “business” of space access.
Agencies of the federal government constitute a significant portion of the 
infrastructure which supports commercial space access. The Department of 
Defense (DoD) is the other key player, from the public sector, in the business of 
space access. DoD (particularly the Air Force) is responsible for conducting 
much of the launch activity in the U.S., as well as sponsoring a large portion of 
the research and development. Federal agencies are also largely responsible 
for setting the tone of the regulatory environment, which can be looked at as 
either facilitating or constraining space access. The Department of 
Transportation is responsible for granting licenses and defining insurance 
guidelines for commercial launch vehicles and activities. Other agencies 
sponsor basic research and are involved in payload development. And 
Congress, of course, is responsible for legislation which affects the conduct of 
space business.
State agencies are becoming involved, to an increasing extent, in the 
business of space flight. All of the states shown in Figure 3-1 have pursued 
some plans to provide a launch facility. Alaska, California, New Mexico, Florida 
and Virginia all currently have state-sponsored “spaceport” activities which 
currently, or will in the near future, have launch capability.
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The commercial space industry, of course, is the provider of the majority 
of space hardware and support services (whether privately funded or under 
government contract). Industry is also the driving force behind commercial 
space, in that it determines the need, markets the customers and designs the 
systems that satisfy that need. Because industry is profit motivated, it also 
provides the impetus for cost accountability and effectiveness in space 
operations.
Insurance providers play a significant role in determining the cost of 
space access. Satellites and payloads are routinely insured against loss or 
damage before, during and subsequent to launching. Third party liability 
insurance against possible loss as a result of the act of launching vehicles is 
also required.
The legal aspects of the space business are complex and, in many areas, 
still being defined. Space law is becoming a specialty among legal practitioners. 
Legal interpretation of various aspects of space enterprise, in addition to being 
a cost element for providers, has an effect on the laws which define the business 
environment.
The academic community provides basic and applied research which 
contributes to the body of knowledge in all of the technology and operations 
domains. Many academic institutions, either individually or cooperatively, 
through consortia and associations, develop scientific experiment payloads and
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satellites. Perhaps most importantly, academia produces the scientists, 
engineers, technicians, managers and business people who populate the space 
infrastructure.
One of the more serious problems for space business ventures is 
securing the large amounts of capital necessary to underwrite spaceborne 
system and launch vehicle development programs. The return on investment 
usually takes many years to materialize, and is (as this investigation tends to 
support) risky. This kind of environment makes the financial industry, and the 
financial decision makers in major corporations, an important sector of the 
infrastructure.
Space-related organizations provide important forums for communications 
regarding business and technology issues. Some have powerful lobbyists 
which can influence high level policy. Others organize efforts of industry, 
government and academia in pursuit of joint space ventures.
International entities play an important role in the infrastructure, mainly by 
way of providing competition to U.S. systems and service providers. In the 
launch services segment of the industry, the competition is especially fierce, due 
to heavy foreign government subsidization of launch vehicle providers. 
International organizations also control the availability of the radio frequency 
spectrum available to proposed communications systems.
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The media plays an important role in disseminating technological and 
business information, and also influences public perception and awareness of 
space issues. The public at large can hold sway over legislative and business 
policy via their votes for public office, proxy votes as stockholders in 
corporations and pressure exerted by special interest groups.
Identification of Factors Affecting Decision Making
The question which provides the arena for the research is whether it is 
advisable to invest in development of the physical and organizational 
infrastructure to support commercial access to space. From a business 
standpoint, the problem would be approached in terms of return on investment, 
which is dependent on the size of the initial outlay and the amounts and timing of 
subsequent cash flows. The uncertainty in the environment for the potential 
investor (that which this research seeks to reduce) manifests itself in terms of 
those future cash flows.
In order for the research to proceed, then, it was necessary to isolate and 
operationally define the factors which exert influence over the investment 
decision (i.e., the potential future cash flows). In general, a decision factor is 
operationally defined as a discernible policy or activity of any person, group, 
organization or sector in the environment that has an influence on the outcome 
of strategic decisions.
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For purposes of this study, the ten most relevant factors which emerged 
from the informal data gathering period were selected. Given the complexity of 
the environment, it is conceded that there exist several other environmental 
factors that can be of influence, but considering the exploratory nature of this 
investigation and its stated objective, investigation of additional, less influential 
factors is expected to yield diminished returns. By definition, in an environment 
characterized by “primary” uncertainty, the full set of these factors cannot be 
defined. Therefore, to require that all factors be identified would defeat the 
purpose of the methodology.
Even with consideration limited to ten factors, there is substantial richness 
and depth to the problem. Attempts at construction of an influence diagram 
(Clemen, 1991) for the factor set were futile: the number of potential influences 
were more numerous than the permutations of the factors.
Since the data gathered for analysis related directly to the set of factors, it 
was necessary to operationally define each of them. The following paragraphs 
provide those definitions and brief discussion of some of the more readily 
apparent influences.
Arguably the most influential of the factors considered is the market for 
space launches, which when viewed historically is the level of launch activity.
For this study, the market is defined as the number of payloads, in the range of 
five hundred to eight thousand pounds that have been manifested for launch into
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low earth orbit. Its relevance to the decision is that the strength of the market 
(the number of payloads) directly affects the investment risk.
The launch cost, per pound of mass, of placing a payload into low earth 
orbit using expendable launch vehicles affects the profitability of the payload 
developers, the ultimate customers for launch services. Reducing the cost of 
orbital access lowers the threshold of acceptance for payload project budgets, 
thereby creating a larger market.
The legal and regulatory environment affects the costs and availability of 
launch services. Environmental laws in the United States effectively limit the 
number of land-based launch sites to those that currently exist, and also place 
some constraint on the types of launch vehicles that can be used. Licensing of 
commercial launches requires conformance to regulatory mandates such as the 
level of third party liability insurance coverage required, range safety, personnel 
safety and interference with on-going air and sea transportation activities. This 
factor is defined in terms of the extent to which the administration is supportive 
of commercial space activities.
The support of the current federal administration and its policy regarding 
commercial space has a distinct effect on the way in which commercial entities 
interact with federal agencies. Aside from NASA, which is treated separately, 
agencies such as the Department of Transportation, Department of Commerce 
and the Environmental Protection Agency play important roles in the facilitation
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of commercial space access. The administration is also influential in 
establishing national policy in many areas which affect the ability of space 
enterprises to compete, both domestically and internationally. This factor is 
defined in terms of the extent to which the administration is supportive of 
commercial space activities.
The amount of competition, defined as the number of competing entities 
offering launch services in the payload range of interest is a determining factor 
of market share and profitability. Competition from foreign providers who are 
substantially underwritten by their governments, is particularly challenging for 
U.S. launch companies.
The introduction of new technology affects both the cost of space access 
and the potential for exploiting the environment of space for commercial and 
scientific endeavors. Technology, in effect, provides the “reason to go” into 
space, as well as the means to get there. In terms of this investigation, the most 
predominant of these technologies are communications, launch vehicle design, 
propulsion, remote sensing, materials processing and life sciences. This factor 
is operationally defined as the aggregate rate of new technology introduction, 
without segregating it into specific technologies.
Public opinion regarding space exploration influences Congress in its 
legislative actions (especially concerning budgets), influences corporate 
decisions via stockholder influence, and influences the number and quality of
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people who are interested in pursuing education and careers in space related 
occupations. Special interest groups can also influence government actions at 
the grass roots level. This factor is defined in terms of the extent to which public 
opinion is supportive of space activities.
The amount of applied academic research performed on space related 
issues and problems directly affects the rate of new technology development 
and application. It also affects the number and quality of potential workers in the 
industry, particularly if performed at academic institutions. This factor is defined 
in terms of the level of space-related academic research.
At the time of this writing, three of the four operational space launch 
facilities in the U.S. are owned by the Department of Defense (Cape Canaveral 
and Vandenberg by the Air Force and White Sands by the Army). The support 
of DoD , and its policy toward private sector activities, therefore, has a marked 
effect on the viability of commercial space activities, due to its influence on cost 
and scheduling of launch activities. This factor is defined in terms of the extent 
to which DoD is supportive of commercial space activities.
The fourth operational launch facility is owned by NASA. The effects on 
commercial space operations, then, are the same as those of DoD. The support 
of NASA, and its policy regarding technology transfer and cooperation with 
commercial enterprises also has a direct effect on the viability of commercial
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activities. This factor is defined in terms of the extent to which NASA is 
supportive of commercial space activities.
The preceding discussion highlights a few of the major interactions that 
are assumed to exist between the factors. There are certainly many more subtle 
but still potent interactions that exist. It is easy to see how difficult it would be to 
identify the individual effects of all the potential interactions, even if they were 
linear and static. Since they are nonlinear and dynamic, direct analysis and 
prediction by mathematical or traditional simulation techniques becomes 
impossible. This gives some insight into the nature and magnitude of the 
uncertainty in the decision environment.
As stated earlier, there is no way to identify all of the factors which might 
influence the decision. For the methodology to be useful in a practical situation, 
however, it is important that as many of the major influences as possible be 
identified and included in the analysis. This brings up an important issue 
regarding the generalizability of this methodology to other decision systems. In 
this research, the researcher was also a domain expert, and this expertise 
(based on knowledge of the environment gleaned from experience and literature 
content analysis in the informal data gathering phase) enabled “direct” 
identification of the environmental sectors and decision factors. It cannot be 
assumed that a researcher in another decision system would have the requisite 
expertise to perform that dual role.
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To generalize the methodology, identification of the infrastructure sectors 
and decision factors must be undertaken as part of the formal data gathering 
process. The additional procedural steps required will be discussed 
subsequently in this chapter, in the section entitled “Selection and Recruitment 
of Survey Respondents.”
Formal Data Gathering 
Human Subjects
In this research, human subjects were used as sources of data. The 
sections to follow discuss the survey instrument and the process of selecting and 
recruiting respondents.
Participation by respondents was on a strictly voluntary basis, and the 
survey instrument was completed at their leisure. Potential respondents were 
contacted by phone and briefed regarding the process prior to agreeing to 
participate. There was no organizational participation: only individuals were 
solicited. No one from the researcher’s organization was solicited for data 
gathering. There was, therefore, no pressure from within an organization to 
participate, and no consequence of not participating. Anonymity of respondents 
was guaranteed, and maintained throughout the process. In this document, they 
are referred to by coded numbers, and any references to themselves in the data 
were stricken.
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This process was designed with two objectives in mind: the first being to 
avoid, as much as possible, exposing the respondents to any potential hardship, 
and the second was to reduce the possibility of any bias being introduced by the 
relationship between the researcher and respondents. All data were collected in 
the absence of real-time contact between researcher and respondent.
Human subjects were also used, subsequently, to support the analysis of 
data. In this instance, the subjects were chosen at random from the researcher’s 
organization. The objective was to preclude researcher bias in the interpretation 
of data, and the only requirement for participation was that the subject be 
unfamiliar with the factors being analyzed. Again, participation was strictly 
voluntary and anonymous. The relationship between the researcher and 
subjects was collegial: none reported to the researcher organizationally. The 
task was simple, involved little time, and was done at their leisure and not in the 
presence of the researcher.
The Survey Instrument
One of the aspects which makes decisions difficult in environments of 
primary uncertainty and nonlinear dynamics is that relevant and meaningful 
quantitative data which directly measures the “amounts" of the factors is not 
readily obtainable. Such is the case for the decision environment under 
investigation. Of the ten factors identified above, only market, cost and
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competition lend themselves to any kind of direct measurement. A method was 
required to collect qualitative data that embodies the kind of information desired: 
relative levels of factors from one period of observation to the next. The 
resulting qualitative instrument was employed for all factors, including those for 
which quantitative data may exist.
When dealing with very large decision scenarios, the level of people 
involved tends to be rather high. The target respondent sample population 
included people with oversight responsibilities (program managers, department 
heads, high level staffers, etc.). Given the constraints on their time, and perhaps 
lower level of technical sophistication, the instrument needed to provide an 
interface that would be readily understandable and somewhat familiar, facilitate 
the desired data format, and be doable in a reasonable amount of time or in 
multiple, short sessions. Because of the geographic dispersion of the desired 
sample group, face-to-face contact for data gathering was not feasible.
Given those requirements and constraints, the survey instrument was 
designed so that it could be self-administered and would operate in a familiar 
environment - a personal computer using Microsoft Windows™. To facilitate the 
gathering of data which highlights changes in levels or amounts of the factors 
from respondents who would not be expected to have hard data, an input 
scheme was devised, using the graphics user interface of the computer. Data is 
entered using the computer’s mouse to create a set of bar graphs which illustrate
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the respondent's knowledge of the historical behavior of factors related to the 
decision at hand.
Each of the ten factors discussed above is the subject of a bar graph and 
has a dedicated data entry screen and data area in the software. The question 
posed for each factor requires the respondent to relate his or her knowledge of 
how the factor has changed over the past decade. The question set is 
reproduced here as Table 3-1. Each bar of a graph corresponds to the relative 
“amount” of the factor under consideration, on a ratio measurement scale 
(Kerlinger, 1986) of zero to ten, for a given year. The independent variable of 
the graph (time) is divided into ten years, ranging from 1985 through 1994.
TABLE 3-1
SURVEY QUESTION SET
Question 1 What has been the relative level of small to mid-sized (500 to 8,000 lbs. to LEO) 
launch activity over the past 10 years?
Question 2 How has the cost per pound of payload mass to LEO, for Expendable Launch 
Vehicles, varied over the past 10 years?
Question 3 How strongly has the legal/regulatory environment supported commercial space 
activities over the past 10 years?
Question 4 How strongly has the federal administration supported commercial space 
activities over the past 10 years?
Question 5 What has been the relative level of competition (how many small to mid-sized 
launch providers, world-wide) over the past 10 years?
Question 6 What has been the relative level of new technology introduction for small to mid­
sized ELV's and satellites over the past 10 years?
Question 7 How supportive of space activities has the public been over the past 10 years?
Question 8 What has been the relative level of space-related academic research activity 
over the past 10 years?
Question 9 How has NASA's support of commercial space varied over the past 10 years?
Question 10 How has DoD's support of commercial space varied over the past 10 years?
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To anchor the data in time, and to support its validity, respondents are 
requested to identify, where possible, specific events which are reflected in 
significant features of the graphs (maxima, minima, points of inflection). The 
reliability of the data, in terms of repeatability, is not considered important here. 
Repeatability in terms of the same respondent duplicating data levels at each 
interval on successive test runs is not important because it is the relative 
changes and trends in the data which are being observed, rather than the 
absolute levels. Inter-respondent repeatability of incremental data was not 
anticipated and not required, since analysis was based on aggregation of these 
data into average responses. Reliability in terms of accuracy is not measurable 
for most of the factors, since the data are qualitative and there is no standard 
against which to measure. Respondents were, however, free to use, and 
specifically asked to identify, the sources of any quantitative data used in their 
responses.
To further support the data validity, there are opportunities associated 
with every data entry screen for respondents to provide additional information 
and comments, in text format. There is also a final summary comments screen 
to provide space for general comments regarding the survey topics or the 
instrument itself.
To provide the easiest path of data input and retrieval, the instrument was 
developed in Microsoft Visual Basic™ and is linked to a Microsoft Access™ data
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base. The software was compiled to an executable code that installs and runs 
under Microsoft Windows™ and is distributed on floppy diskettes. Respondents 
were required to run the software program and return the diskettes to the 
researcher when finished. Appendix B provides a complete set of the software 
“screens” as they appear to the respondent, and a copy of the instructions for 
use which accompanied each diskette.
Selection and Recruitment of Survey Respondents 
The objectives of this phase of the study were twofold. The first was to 
ensure that there was a sufficient number of responses to each question to yield 
a data sample size sufficient to apply some statistical techniques to evaluate the 
data, and to provide some confidence in using the average response as data for 
the analysis. The target, given the limitations of resources available and the 
expected inability of respondents to address all of the ten questions posed, was 
to obtain a minimum of five responses to each question.
The qualifications for respondents required that they be rather intimately 
involved, in a decision making position, in their specific infrastructure sector. 
They would also possess experience and/or knowledge of the environment that 
extends over the past decade. This kind of respondent demographic ruled out a 
random sampling scheme. A purposeful sampling scheme (Patton, 1990) was 
implemented to achieve the objective.
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The second objective was to maximize the breadth of responses over the 
various sectors of the infrastructure. A maximum variation sampling scheme 
(Patton, 1990) was adopted. While this sampling scheme is more likely to 
induce apparent randomness in the responses, it serves to highlight those 
particularly significant patterns which emerge from a diverse respondent group. 
The target was to have at least one respondent from each of the infrastructure 
sectors (with the exception of the general public and international entities).
In order to ensure that the minimum of five responses would be obtained 
for each question, a total of twenty potential respondents were solicited. To 
maximize the potential number of qualified responses per respondent, a 
selection process was devised using the principles of Quality Function 
Deployment (QFD) as described by Bossert (1991). QFD is a quality tool that 
establishes the framework for articulating exactly what an organization needs to 
do to respond to customer requirements. The mechanism is a set of correlation 
matrices which, at the lowest level, relate the “whats" (customer requirements) to 
the “hows” (organizational responses). The magnitudes of the correlations, 
expressed numerically in the matrix cells, indicate the leverage of the 
organizational responses in satisfying customer requirements.
The correlation matrix shown in Figure 3-2 was developed, relating the 
infrastructure sectors to the decision factors. The correlations indicated in the 
matrix cells were developed by the researcher, based on information obtained

















\  . °  12 \  'w o
\  9 «  









































































NASA 3 3 3 9 3 9 1 3 9 3
Federal Agencies 9 3 9 9 3 1 3 1 1 9
Space Industry 9 9 3 3 9 9 1 1 9 3
State Agencies 3 3 3 1 1 3 1 1
Legal Providers 1 9 1
Financial Providers 3 9 1 1 1
Academia 3 9
Media 3 1 1 3 1 3 3 1 3 3
Associations/Orgs 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 1 3 3
Insurance Providers 3 3 3 1
Key: 1 = mild correlation, 3 = moderate correlation, 9 = strong correlation
Figure 3 -2 . Correlation M atrix * Decision Factors to Environm ental Sectors
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during the informal data gathering phase, and represent the expected ability of a 
person in a particular sector to be knowledgeable regarding the associated 
factor. The number of respondents to be solicited from each sector was 
determined by multiplying the weighted average of the correlation scores for 
each sector (row in the matrix) by the desired number of respondents (twenty).
In order to further encourage diversity of respondent viewpoints, 
whenever more than one respondent was to be solicited from a sector, they 
would be selected, where possible, from different subgroups as shown on Figure
3-1. Once the sector subgroups were identified, contact was established via 
telephone with individuals meeting the experience/knowledge criteria. Those 
who agreed to participate were provided with the survey instrument. A listing of 
the positions held by the solicited respondents is provided as Appendix C.
Returning to the issue of generalizing the data gathering process to 
situations in which the researcher is not also a domain expert, it is evident that 
some modification to the above methodology would be required. In the case of a 
“naive” researcher, a two-stage survey of respondents would be necessitated to 
ensure that all relevant factors and sectors are addressed in the survey process.
It is reasonable to assume that in an organization making strategic 
decisions of the type addressed, there will be individuals who can formulate a 
“basic set” of decision factors and environmental sectors, and also identify 
potential respondents within those sectors. To develop a full spectrum of factors
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and sectors from this basic set, QFD techniques would again be used. In this 
case, a matrix with partially completed axes (containing only the basic set of 
factors and sectors) would be distributed to the limited set of respondents, who 
would then be asked to complete the matrix and establish the correlations. From 
the responses, a comprehensive set of factors, and a complete list of sectors 
from which to draw additional respondent candidates could be generated. 
Correlation figures would establish the levels of sector representation in the 
candidate mix, as before.
Data Analysis 
Data Processing
The survey software automatically converts the qualitative graphic inputs 
to numeric variables on the zero to ten ratio scale, and stores the values in a 
Microsoft Access™ data base file on the survey diskette upon completion of 
program execution. Data from returned survey responses were compiled in a 
Microsoft Excel™ spreadsheet. The spreadsheet was used to calculate and plot 
all parameters and statistics used in the analysis. Quantitative data and 
comments were also transferred to a Microsoft Word™ file and presented as 
Appendix D.
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Development of Marginal Change Data 
The primary characteristic of the data which is examined in this analysis is 
the relationship of marginal changes, over successive years, between two or 
more of the environmental “factors” which influence the decision. The analysis 
evolved through two approaches.
The first approach was to generate the arithmetic mean of the responses 
for each factor-year (launch costs in 1986, for example). The incremental 
differences, or “deltas,” between successive yearly means were calculated and 
used as the marginal change data. This approach, however, was seen to have 
some shortcomings. As anticipated, the small sample size and diversity of 
respondents gave rise to a substantial sample variance in the raw data for some 
of the factor-years. The level of variance suggested that the content validity of 
the data (whether the data were a representative sample of the characteristics of 
the environment) was an issue to be addressed. (A detailed discussion of the 
validity issues of the research is contained in Chapter 4). Due to these 
shortcomings, this approach was abandoned.
In order to address the content validity issue, the second approach was 
devised. It allowed the ancillary data (identification of related events and 
additional comments) provided by the respondents to be incorporated into a 
filtering process which employed a consensus seeking algorithm (described
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below) and a polling scheme to reinforce a majority opinion regarding the
direction of change in the marginal factor-year data.
The approach was implemented by first generating the incremental
changes in the factor-year data for each of the respondents, for successive year
pairs. Using respondent S-1-1 as an example, the data provided for launch
costs in 1992 and 1993 were 5.75 and 6.25, respectively. The incremental
change, then, is +0.50, or +5% of full scale. The incremental changes so derived
were compared among respondents, and aggregate data points generated
based on the following rules for inclusion.
If 75% or more of the respondents for that factor indicated the 
same direction of change (positive or negative), a consensus was 
assumed and those in agreement were used to generate an 
average. The ancillary data were consulted to see if there existed 
any factual evidence to overrule the consensus. The ancillary data 
were also consulted for explanation of any “outliers” (incremental 
changes that differed from the average by more than 25% of full 
scale). If the ancillary data conclusively demonstrated that the 
outlier was a result of faulty interpretation or assumption, it was 
discarded: otherwise it was retained.
If a 75% consensus was not observed, the ancillary data were 
consulted to determine if there was conclusive evidence of the 
direction of change. In the absence of any such evidence, the 
arithmetic mean of all the incremental changes was used as the 
data point for that factor-year pair.
The data generated by this second approach were used in the remainder of the
analysis.
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Development and Analysis of Phase Plane Diagrams 
In order to examine the nonlinear dynamic relationships between the 
factors, it is valuable to plot their trajectories over time. A phase plane diagram, 
as suggested by Priesmeyer (1992), is constructed by plotting the marginal 
change data of any two factors on Cartesian coordinates. Figure 3-3 is the 
phase plane diagram which compares the marginal changes in the “Launch 
Cost” factor to those of the “Legal/Regulatory Environment” factor. The 
trajectory of the relationship between these two factors is shown for changes in 
the year-pairs 1985-1986 through 1993-1994. The arrow represents the 
direction of time progression. The axis scales are in terms of percentage of full 
scale change on the ratio measurement scale used in collecting data. Since the 
factors are all macroscopic in nature, it is assumed that the decision maker has 
no significant influence over changes in the factor levels. Therefore, there is no 
designation of independent and dependent variables in the phase plane 
diagrams. The axes are chosen arbitrarily.
There are several important pieces of information that can be drawn from 
examination of these diagrams. Those which are generic to this analysis are 
discussed in the following paragraphs.























Figure 3-3. Phase Plane : Legal/Regulatory Environment vs. Launch Cost
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Periodicity
The phase plane, as is evident in Figure 3-3, is divided into four 
quadrants, with the Cartesian coordinate origin at their intersection. A data point 
at the origin would indicate no change in either factor. Points in Quadrant 1 
indicate positive changes in both factors, while those in Quadrant 3 indicate 
negative changes in both factors. Quadrants on the minor axis (Quadrants 2 
and 4) indicate positive changes in one factor accompanied in time by negative 
changes in the other. The visits to these quadrants by the trajectories can 
indicate some kind of periodicity, which implies some predictability, or a lack of 
periodicity, which is indicative of a higher order of chaotic behavior and little or 
no predictability. Priesmeyer uses a method of determining periodicity by 
observing the four most recent marginal changes. If all four are in the same 
quadrant, there are no oscillations between the factors and it is identified as a 
“Period 1” trajectory. If the four observations are confined to two quadrants, a 
tendency toward a simple, bi-polar oscillation is indicated, and the trajectory is 
identified as a “Period 2.” If all four quadrants are visited, there is a suggestion 
of oscillation of the two factors at different frequencies (e.g., one may switch 
sense every year while the other switches every two years). Repeatability of the 
four quadrant sequence would need to be verified from earlier data to verify this 
behavior, which is identified as a “Period 4” trajectory. Any trajectories which do
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not follow such patterns are considered to be in high order chaos and are 
identified as “Period 8.”
All of the factor-pair phase planes were classified in this manner. To 
evaluate factor-pair relationships for transitions in periodicity (becoming more or 
less chaotic) the same process was applied to the four data points immediately 
preceding the final four.
Prior to the foregoing classification of the factor-pair relationships, each 
of the phase planes were examined qualitatively by the researcher to determine 
the existence of any pattern in the trajectories which might indicate where the 
next data point might lie. This was accomplished by observing the trajectory 
and making a mark on the plot at the location considered most likely for the next 
data point. Since there was a significant potential for invalid data due to 
researcher bias (a pre-disposed notion of the factor relationships) in this 
process, others who were not part of the research and were considered to have 
little knowledge of the environment in question were enlisted to repeat that 
analysis. They were told only that it was a time series of data and that their 
responses should be based on whatever pattern the plot appeared to be 
generating. Data were recorded from the researcher and four additional 
“analysis respondents,” noting the quadrant of the projected next data point and 
whether that point was positioned closer to or farther from the origin.
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This process of next point prediction might give rise to some questions
concerning reliability of the resultant data. How is it possible for someone with
no knowledge of the system to accurately predict what it will do next?
Priesmeyer (1992) treats this issue in his discussion of visioning as a forecasting
and decision making tool. He makes several credible arguments. First, he
contends that, since the system is acknowledged to be chaotic, standard
objective forecasting models (extrapolation, econometric, segmentation and the
like) provide little insight. Secondly, since the complexity precludes exact
numerical prediction of behavior, it is more appropriate to observe the dynamic
changes in the system as predictors of “realms” of future behavior. Thirdly, that
awareness of the identity and values of the factors represented on the axes is
not required to obtain meaningful data. The use of the naive analysts herein
was prompted by Priesmeyer’s method of visioning a future for an organization.
He selected his “next point” from a phase plane without paying any attention to
the values of the parameters. He describes the process as follows:
I chose a position that simply looked right - it looked appropriate 
given the pattern on the screen. It looked consistent and 
reasonable with the pattern of things. It seems important that the 
proposed position was chosen without regard to the numbers. It is 
a future condition that seems consistent with the current state of 
the system and the apparent forces that control the behavior of the 
system. (Priesmeyer 1992,179-180)
The implication is that one need not know (and is perhaps better off not
knowing) the nature of the system. All that is required is recognition of a pattern:
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something that the human mind is especially well suited to. In the case of the 
process of generating the next point data herein, it is considered an advantage 
for the analysts to be unaware of the mechanisms of the behavior, in order to 
preclude the potential of perceived causal relationships contaminating the 
analysis.
This is an important issue when considering the generalizability of the 
methodology. There is no requirement for researchers to be domain experts in 
either the decision environment or in the application of nonlinear dynamic 
systems techniques.
The periodicity and “next-point” projections were used to isolate factor- 
pair relationships which are most likely to contain information regarding future 
behavior and present the possibility of inter-factor causal relationships. Each 
factor was compared with the set of nine remaining factors. In each set, the 
factor-pairs which exhibited a low periodicity (2 or 1) for the latest four year 
period, and either decreasing or consistent periodicity over the two four year 
periods were first isolated. From that group, the single factor-pair which 
exhibited the lowest and most consistent periodicity and most consistent next 
point quadrant selection was selected for further analysis. This process yielded 
one factor-pair for each factor.
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Limit Cycles
A limit cycle is the trajectory of the changing relationships between factors 
as it is plotted on the phase plane. Generally, there are two types of limit cycles 
of interest here.
In the first, the dynamic relationship remains within an observed region 
(not necessarily in one quadrant) of the phase plane over the ten year period of 
observation, reversing its direction whenever it appears to be headed out of the 
region. Figure 3-3 illustrates such behavior. It is likely that the trajectory is 
bound to an attractor of some kind. An attractor is some point or set of points 
(which are not necessarily identifiable) which define a “basin” or domain of 
behavior from which the system will not stray unless acted on by some external 
stimulus. Even though the relationship may display high order chaotic behavior, 
the attractor applies some constraint to the behavior. As related by Ashby:
“That something is predictable implies that there exists a constraint” (Ashby 
1956,132). Without any constraint on the system, there would be an infinite 
variety of possible states, all behavior would be random, and no information 
would be obtainable. So the existence of an attractor allows some information 
(in terms of what the trajectory is unlikely to do, more than what it absolutely will 
do) to be imparted.
The second potential kind of behavior involves an “escape” from an 
attractor due to some external stimulus. Such behavior is illustrated in Figure
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3-4. This behavior is the most prominent cause of what has been termed (and 
identified in the analysis as) Period 1. Even though it may be escaping an 
attractor, the trajectory, having remained in the same quadrant for at least four 
consecutive years, is likely to persist in that quadrant unless the changes have 
been diminishing in magnitude. This too provides some information regarding 
the relationship between the two factors involved.
The information obtained from the limit cycles was used to support the 
identification of those relationships most likely to contain information regarding 
future behavior. The results are discussed in Chapter 4.
Development of System Uncertainty Index 
Ashby (1956) defines variety as the quantity of distinguishable elements 
in a given set or possible states that a system can assume. As discussed in the 
prior section, for information to be extracted from the system (a reduction in 
uncertainty), there also must be some constraint, for without constraint all 
changes of system state would be random. In terms of the factor-pair dynamic 
behavior examined herein, variety can be considered to be a function of the 
number of possible states that the two factors might take at any given time. 
Constraint can be considered to be imposed by the presence of an attractor, 
which limits the excursions of the dynamic trajectory to a specific realm.
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Pursuant to this discussion of variety and constraint, it can be stated that 
if the system constraints are relaxed and the possible number of states 
increases, then the uncertainty associated with that system increases. The data 
used in this analysis is the set of marginal changes between pairs of decision 
factors. Increasing rates of change, then, with the knowledge that they cannot 
continue to increase indefinitely, can be said to be indicative of greater variety 
and/or a relaxation of constraint since, in the phase plane, those conditions 
would expand the boundaries of a limit cycle, or perhaps escape the current 
attractor entirely.
On the phase planes, the magnitude of change can be expressed by the 
magnitude of vectors extending from the origin to the data points, as shown in 
Figure 3-5. Increasing vector magnitudes, then, will indicate increasing rates of 
change (and, consequently, increasing uncertainty) relating to the dynamic 
interaction of the factor-pair.
For this research, the System Uncertainty Index (SUI) is operationally 
defined as the sum of the absolute values of those vector magnitudes in a given 
time period (one year, in this study) for the system under investigation. The 
analysis includes treatment of each factor as related to the remaining nine, and 
also the entire system of 45 factor-pair interactions.


































Summary of Methodological Process 
The methodology described in this chapter is considered to be a primary 
contribution of this research. The technique of identifying and correlating the 
sectors of the decision environment and the factors affecting those decisions 
evolved experientially over a period of three years of interaction with the 
commercial space infrastructure as illustrated in Figure 3-1. The primary data 
gathering instrument was designed to make use of available computer 
technology and facilitate participation from a broad spectrum of respondents who 
were geographically dispersed. As discussed in Chapter 2, the analysis 
techniques were derived from research in the field of nonlinear dynamics. New 
ways of analyzing and presenting the data resulted in the formulation of two 
hypotheses (hh and H2, to be presented in Chapter 4) which represent potential 
tools for reduction of uncertainty in complex, nonlinear, dynamic decision 
environments. Figure 3-6 is a pictorial representation of the process of 
methodological development.



















































The following paragraphs present and discuss the findings and results of 
the data analysis.
Filtered Marginal Change Data 
The data set derived from the polling/filtering method for marginal change 
data described in Chapter 3, and decision rationale for each data point are 
presented in Appendix E. The data set is reproduced here as Table 4-1. These 
are the data used in the remainder of the analysis.
TABLE 4-1 
FILTERED MARGINAL CHANGE DATA
Year Pair *85786 *86/87 *87788 *88/*89 ‘89790 *90791 *91792 *92793 *93794
Launch Activity - 59.69 - 5.00 5.62 1.64 18.13 1.33 5.78 3.36 -0.94
Launch Costs - 1.67 - 2.92 -0.78 -0.31 2.29 0 1.25 2.03 3.75
Legal/Reg. Environ. 1.7 5.98 5.5 3.96 4.48 12.25 0.27 •4.64 - 3.3
Fed. Admin. Support 2.41 4.8 6.5 4.64 0.31 - 0.98 1.96 - 1.25 - 5.09
Competition - 1.76 5.88 1.88 12.19 16.57 9.27 - 1.34 7.14 2.41
New Technology 3.84 9.22 11.72 19 - 1.43 4.38 10.94 4.64 4.63
Public Support - 1.25 - 13.96 -6.57 - 6.5 - 4.07 - 2.5 - 5.63 - 1.13 - 0.98
Academic Research - 19.79 - 1.09 2.03 - 1.25 3.13 - 0.16 - 1.72 -4.22 - 7.71
NASA Support - 1.48 - 1.17 0.15 0.78 - 1.09 - 5.63 - 1.56 - 0.08 - 6.33
DoD Support -0.27 3.04 3.21 3.3 0.63 1.07 6.72 10.36 13.96
68
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Phase Planes for Pair-Wise Comparison of Marginal 
Changes in Decision Factors
There are certain repeatable limit cycle patterns which are characteristic 
of low order chaos. Classical Period 1 behavior is described by either no 
change in either factor or a constant change in one or both. In any case, the 
limit cycle is confined to one quadrant on the phase plane (or to the origin, if 
neither factor changes) and is (theoretically) described by a single point. Figure 
4-1 a shows a more realistic pattern which might be observed, with a tight 
clustering in one area.
Classic Period 2 behavior involves oscillation between Quadrants 1 and 
3, indicating a positive change in both factors in one time period, followed by a 
negative change in both in the following period. The limit cycle would trace a 
continuous path close to the major axis of the phase plane, as shown in Figure
4-1 b. A limit cycle traversing the minor (Quadrant 2 - Quadrant 4) axis is also 
possible. Other common Period 2 behavior is characterized by alternating 
positive and negative changes in one factor, while the other factor remains 
relatively constant. The limit cycle would appear similar to that of Figure 4-1 c.
Classic Period 4 behavior is exemplified by the “bow-tie” pattern of the 
limit cycle, as shown in Figure 4-1 d. This pattern is caused by one factor 
changing sense every period (the vertical axis in figure 4-1 d) while the other 
changes sense every second period (the horizontal axis in 4-1 d).
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Figure 4-1. Classical Limit Cycle Behavior
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With the ten factors, there are 45 pair-wise comparisons possible. A 
complete set of the phase plane diagrams is provided in Appendix F.
None of the phase plane trajectories shown in Appendix F are observed 
to demonstrate any of the foregoing low-order limit cycle behavior over the entire 
ten year period of investigation, thus indicating that all are described by a higher 
order of chaotic behavior. That is not to say, however, that no information can 
be derived. As Priesmeyer contends, complex patterns of behavior are driven by 
the combination of many lower-order chaotic interactions which are themselves 
deterministic, but too numerous to allow for direct observation.
The implication from the current data, then, is that extremely complex 
environmental forces are at work, which defy precise measurement and 
quantitative prediction of system behavior. It is also possible that factors other 
than the ones considered are affecting the system behavior.
Recent behavior (over the last four years) and projected behavior (for 
next year) do demonstrate some greater consistency, which allows certain 
relationships to be isolated and examined further to support generation of 
hypotheses via the analysis technique described for periodicity in Chapter 3.
The data from that portion of the analysis are presented as Appendix G.
Figure 4-2 is the phase plane diagram for the NASA Support/Launch Cost 
factor-pair, which appears as Factor-Pair 16 in Appendix G. The trajectory 
traced by the dynamic interaction (in terms of phase plane quadrant visited) is
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listed chronologically. As is evident from Figure 4-2, the trajectory has remained 
in Quadrant 4 for the past four years. In the immediately preceding four year 
period, the trajectory visited Quadrants 3, 2 and 4. Under the classification 
scheme described in Chapter 3, the behavior of this interaction shifted from 
Period 8 (high-order chaos) to Period 1 (low-order chaos), as also shown in the 
“Periodicity” data field of Appendix G.
The “Projected Behavior” data field in Appendix G summarizes the results 
of the “next point” projections provided by the analysis respondents and the 
researcher. In the data field, the dual notation for each response indicates the 
projected quadrant number and whether the next point identified was closer to 
(“IN") or further from (“OUT”) the phase plane origin than the last historical data 
point. These projections are also plotted as points labeled “R” and “1” through 
“4” in Figure 4-2, which illustrates, for this factor-pair, a consensus on the 
projected quadrant and a near-consensus on divergence from the origin. 
Additional illustrations of phase plane diagrams containing next point projections 
are provided in Appendix I.
The end result of that analysis is a listing of the most stable and 
predictable factor-pair relationship (lowest historical periodicity, supported by 
consensus regarding projected behavior) for each factor, as presented in Table
4-2. A graphical representation which more clearly shows these relationships is 
presented as Figure 4-3.
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Figure 4-3. Most Stable Inter-Factor Relationships
TABLE 4-2
MOST STABLE INTER-FACTOR RELATIONSHIPS
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Prime Factor Related Factor Periodicity Quadrant
Launch Activity Launch Cost 2 1
Launch Cost Academic Research 1 4
Legal/Reg. Environ. Launch Cost 2 1
Fed. Admin. Support NASA Support 2 3
Competition Academic Research 2 4
New Technology NASA Support 1 4
Public Support DoD Support 1 2
Academic Research DoD Support 1 2
NASA Support Launch Cost 1 4
DoD Support Academic Research 1 2
In the figure, bi-directional arrows depict factor-pair relationships 
exhibiting the lowest order of chaos and most consistent next point predictions. 
The arrows are annotated with information concerning the projected future 
trajectories. Arithmetic signs at either end of the arrows indicate the direction of 
the marginal change of the connected factor. Adjacent to each arrow is the 
quadrant the trajectory is projected to visit, and an indication of whether the 
trajectory is projected to converge toward or diverge from the phase plane origin.
The most striking observation from Figure 4-3 is that one factor, Launch 
Cost, appears to be central in the diagram. It is directly linked to more factors 
than any of the others. The implication of this is that launch cost is a focal point 
in the decision system since it reacts more predictably in conjunction with the 
greatest number of other factors. From the point of view of a passive decision 
maker, it would be the best (but certainly not the only) variable in the system to 
use as a barometer. From the point of view of a proactive decision maker or
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policy maker, efforts to alter the cost of launch activities would be most likely to 
provide maximum leverage on the behavior of the decision environment.
Based on knowledge of the space launch industry, this conclusion is 
appropriate. The primary impediment to space exploration over the years has 
been the cost of space transportation (current estimates are between $5,000 
and $10,000 per pound to low earth orbit).
Presentation of data in this manner can also lead to discovery of 
unimagined dynamic interactions which affect the system. As an example, 
consider the interaction between launch costs and launch activity shown in 
Figure 4-3. On the surface, it might seem that there would be a causal 
relationship in which decreasing launch costs would engender increasing launch 
activity. The data, however, indicate that the trajectory of the dynamic 
interaction between these two factors has spent most of its recent history in 
Quadrant 1, and is projected to return there by the majority of analysis 
respondents. Quadrant 1 is visited when the two factors are increasing 
simultaneously. An alternative explanation which could account for this behavior 
is that as the demand for launch capacity increases, in the absence of an 
increase in that capacity, the cost rises. In terms of the decision regarding 
whether or not to invest in space launch infrastructure, this kind of dynamic, if 
proven valid, would have a great deal of relevance.
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Not all of the relationships in the figure are as readily decipherable.
There are two possible explanations. The first is that the limitations of the data 
gathering process (to be discussed in detail subsequently) have led to an 
insufficient number of raw data points to develop a complete set of valid 
interactions. The other possibility is that there are dynamic relationships 
between factors that are unfamiliar to the researcher, and which warrant further 
investigation.
The foregoing discussion does not imply that interactions other than those 
isolated in Figure 4-3 cannot cause unexpected changes in the decision 
environment. It also is not offered as a proof of causality, since that data did not 
generate conclusive evidence of long term, repeatable periodic behavior. It 
does imply that causal relationships are more likely in the interactions of lower 
order chaos that have been isolated. Ashby (1956), in discussing Black Box 
Theory, makes the point that some systems are too complex for analysis of their 
internal mechanisms. System behavior, then, becomes predictable by observing 
how its outputs react in response to certain stimuli. Applying that theoretical 
perspective here implies that if certain dynamic relationships persist with a low 
order of chaos, even in the absence of an obvious one-to-one causal 
relationship, there is a useful element of predictability.
In the absence of other decision support data, or as a way of augmenting 
other data, this methodology serves to identify the dynamic relationships which
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possess a greater degree of predictability. In order to ensure robustness in the 
decision process, this kind of analysis should be repeated at specified intervals, 
and/or whenever the possibility of an extraordinary event arises. In the decision 
environment under study herein, one of the decisions supported would be to 
invest in additional space launch infrastructure of the nature which would reduce 
the cost of space access.
This methodology also serves another useful purpose. It provides a 
framework which focuses attention on system behavior, rather than on 
microanalysis using statistical data. Observing the trajectories and limit cycles 
of marginal change data on phase plane diagrams, as pointed out by 
Priesmeyer, has the potential to shed light on relationships which define system 
behavior in a way that conventional statistical data do not. Awareness of these 
relationships add conceptual depth to existing predictive tools such as scenario 
generation and “what i f  analyses. The policy or decision maker armed with this 
information is better prepared to deal with highly complex and uncertain 
environments.
System Uncertainty Index (SUI)
As discussed in Chapter 3 (and illustrated in Figure 3-5), the numerical 
value of the SUI, for a given one-year time interval, is the absolute sum of the 
magnitudes of the vectors from the phase plane origin to the trajectories of all of 
the factor-pairs. While these values have no absolute meaning, trends and
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points of inflection in the index provide significant information. If the values are 
observed to be increasing in successive time intervals, it can be concluded that 
the trajectories (on average) are diverging from the origin, thereby 
encompassing a larger state space for potential behavior. The greater number 
of possible states that the system can assume equates to greater aggregate 
system variety and uncertainty (Ashby, 1956). It is, therefore, a measure of the 
amount of risk inherent in the investment decision.
Figure 4-4 shows the composite SUI for all decision factor-pair dynamic 
relationships. There are three important characteristics of the plotted data. The 
first is the high peak evident in the data from 1985 to 1986. The space shuttle 
Challenger explosion occurred in early 1986. This event had serious 
repercussions throughout the international space community. A high degree of 
uncertainty is, therefore, not unexpected in that timeframe. The second feature 
of interest is the peak in the two year period from 1988 to 1990. According to 
ancillary data provided by the survey respondents, a significant number of new 
launch service providers emerged during this time period, having a significant 
impact on the competitive environment.
The third, and perhaps most important feature of the plotted data of 
Figure 4-4 is the consistent upward swing over the most recent two year period. 
According to the ancillary data supplied, the timeframe coincides with the onset 
of cutbacks in federal funding for those NASA, DoD and research programs that
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Figure 4-4. Composite System Uncertainty Index
are supporting space activities: a phenomenon which continues through the 
present. The unrest and uncertainty in these major U.S. infrastructure elements 
has pervaded the targeted decision environment. Data from the analysis 
respondents indicates that the trend will persist. Of their responses regarding 
the direction of the next point on the phase planes, 69.3% indicated that the 
next data point would diverge from the origin. It is also noteworthy that in Figure 
4-3, seven of the nine interactions were predicted to be diverging.
This increasing trend in the level of uncertainty in the decision 
environment should act as a warning signal to potential investors that the risks 
are increasing. It must be noted, however, that Figure 4-4 only depicts rate of 
change in the dynamic environment. Given that some kinds of change can be 
beneficial (even though a steadily increasing rate of change is indicative of
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instability), it is advisable to further investigate the elements which contribute 
most significantly to this rise in the level of uncertainty.
Table 4-3 contains the SUI data for each of the factors as compared to 
the other nine. Graphic representations of these data are contained in Appendix 
H. Remembering that the ancillary data indicated that the increased level of 
uncertainty related to federal funding cutbacks and agency shake-ups, the SUI 
data for four factors, Support of the Federal Administration, Level of Academic 
Research, NASA Support and DoD Support, were examined, with the following 
observations concerning the two most recent time periods:
• Table 4-3 shows that the rate of change in the level of support by the 
federal administration declined slightly (from 42 to 41) and then rose 
sharply (from 41 to 67). As shown in Table 4-1, the contribution of this 
factor to the system uncertainty has been comprised of changes in the 
negative (undesirable) direction, that is, a reduction in the level of 
support by the federal administration.
•  The rate of change in the level of academic research rose dramatically 
in each of the two periods (from 41 to 55 and from 55 to 85). The 
contribution of this factor has also been in the negative (undesirable) 
direction, that is, a reduction in the level of research activity.
•  The rate of change in the level of NASA support declined slightly (from 
40 to 39) and then increased sharply (from 39 to 75). The contribution 
of this factor has also been in the negative (undesirable) direction, that 
is, a reduction in the level of support by NASA.
•  The rate of change in the level of DoD support rose substantially in 
each of the time periods (from 72 to 99 and from 99 to 132). The 
contribution from this factor has been in the positive (desirable) 
direction, that is, an increase in the level of support by DoD.




FACTOR t85P*S •S6TS7 **7/*88 •88TS9 *89/,90 •90^91 *91/*92 *92/*93 •93T94
Launch Activity 341 70 68 57 171 41 65 50 49
Launch Coat 98 59 44 53 59 38 39 43 60
Legal/Ref. Environ. 98 76 67 68 71 116 37 58 58
Fed. Admin. Support 101 69 74 71 52 40 42 41 67
Competition 98 75 48 124 159 93 39 75 54
New Technology 109 97 112 177 55 58 104 58 65
Public Support 96 133 74 83 68 47 64 40 49
Academic Research 222 53 48 55 63 38 41 55 85
NASA Support 97 53 44 54 54 66 40 39 75
DoD Support 94 60 54 64 52 40 72 99 132
All four of the factors exhibited increasing rates of change. Three of the four are 
observed to be changing in undesirable directions. An investor aware that the 
uncertainty in the environment is increasing and that the factors contributing to 
that uncertainty are changing in the undesirable direction would be better 
informed regarding potential risk, and adjust his or her required rate of return or 
payback period accordingly. In terms of the space launch infrastructure 
investment decision posed as the object of this study, the findings imply that the 
most robust strategy would be to piecemeal the infrastructure development, 
committing funds initially to those elements which can be implemented quickly 
and be capable of generating financial returns even in the absence of any 
further development.
What is also noteworthy about the data of Table 4-3 is that the SUI for the 
Launch Cost factor is consistently lower than that of the other factors. This 
correlates well with the finding discussed above and shown in Figure 4-3.
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Summary and Hypotheses 
The findings have demonstrated that the methodology developed herein 
can provide some utility in the arena of large-scale decision making and policy 
formulation. It can serve as another approach in an eclectic schema (Armstrong, 
1968) of forecasting and policy decisions. This study is a preliminary 
investigation of the use of nonlinear dynamics techniques in this type of decision 
environment. Its size and scope were limited by the availability of time and 
resources, and its objective was to develop some hypotheses which provide 
direction for future research. Based on the findings discussed above, the 
following hypotheses are posed for further investigation:
Hv The analysis of trajectories and limit cycles of marginal change 
data as described herein identifies dynamic relationships among 
decision factors which are most likely to influence the decision 
environment, when that environment is large, quantitative data is 
not readily available, and there exists a high degree of uncertainty 
and nonlinearity.
H2: The System Uncertainty Index, as developed herein, is a measure
of the aggregate uncertainty, and can support decision making by 
isolating trends in the magnitude of uncertainty in a given decision 
environment or making comparisons of uncertainty/risk levels 
between various decision environments.
Limitations
The objective of this research has not been to validate hypotheses, but to 
investigate new ways of reducing uncertainty and generate hypotheses 
regarding tools and techniques which may be of use in strategic decision making
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and policy formulation. There are certain limitations implicit in the methodology, 
most of which arise as a result of the practical constraints on resources and time 
to complete. The limitations fall into two general categories, biases and data 
validity, and are discussed in the paragraphs to follow.
Biases
For expediency in this study, the researcher selected the decision factors 
based on experience and content analysis of pertinent documentation. While 
the list of documentation (Appendix A) is considered comprehensive, it is by no 
means all inclusive. Therefore, some researcher bias may be associated with 
the selection of factors. However, for purposes of this exploratory research, 
potential omissions are not considered a serious threat to the validity of the data 
or results. In future research, this type of bias can be avoided by allowing the 
survey respondents (domain experts) to select the factors as part of the data 
collection process.
The survey instrument and its execution, due to the very limited personal 
contact involved, were relatively free from any researcher bias. Biases of the 
individual respondents were offset, to the greatest extent possible, by the 
directed sampling techniques which solicited respondents from diverse sectors 
of the environment. The limited sample size, however, cannot guarantee the 
absence of respondent bias.
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The object of the analysis phase was to use the theoretical perspective of 
nonlinear dynamics to examine the data for meaningful patterns and indications 
of useful information. This kind of process is subject to researcher bias of the 
nature of seeing patterns which do not exist or “force fitting” data into anticipated 
results. Analysis of a judgmental nature (prediction of the next point on a phase 
plane) is especially susceptible to this type of bias. To provide integrity to the 
process, four people unfamiliar with the subject matter of the research were 
enlisted to repeat the analysis process employed by the researcher. They were 
provided only the information needed to accomplish the task. Only data points 
agreed upon independently by at least four of the five analysts were considered 
further.
A potential for researcher bias is also introduced in the filtering process 
used to develop the marginal change data for analysis. The risk was mitigated 
by a conservative approach which retained all data not proven to be inaccurate 
by ancillary data provided by other respondents. Of course there is still some 
potential for bias, since the researcher was the sole interpreter of the ancillary 
data.
Validity of Data and Results
Since the nature of the study was exploratory and limited resources were 
available, the sample size was small. Of twenty-one respondents invited and 
agreeing to participate, only eight submitted meaningful data. Consequently, the
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desired breadth of coverage of the sectors of the infrastructure was not 
achieved. The target size for responses for a given survey question (from which 
the decision factor marginal change data were developed) was a minimum of 
five. Of the ten questions, two (those pertaining to launch costs and level of 
academic research) received only four responses. All other questions received 
at least seven responses. With this limited amount of data, there is an issue of 
content validity, which is raised mainly by the potential for sampling errors. The 
question that must be addressed is whether the sample data used for analysis is 
truly representative of the universe (the decision environment) considered. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the ancillary data collected was intended to, and in fact 
did, ameliorate the situation, but there still exists some degree of uncertainty in 
this regard.
The objective of the study was to examine decision environments which 
are large and difficult to quantify. Accordingly, the questions posed to the 
respondents were, by design, highly qualitative, subjective and broad in scope. 
The consequence of this is that an issue of construct validity is introduced by the 
degree of interpretation left to the respondents. The issue is whether the 
respondents were all answering the same questions; that is, whether all 
questions were perceived in the same way. Requests for additional supporting 
information (the ancillary data) built into the survey instrument met with limited 
success. In future research efforts, it would be advisable to include some
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mechanism (Delphi method or automated decision support system, for example) 
to arrive at a consensus among respondents based on supporting data extracted 
during the process.
The analysis of the dynamic relationships does not fully account for time 
lags in the effects of factors on one another. If the lag is relatively short (in the 
range of one to three years) the relationship is likely to be evident on the phase 
plane diagrams. However, for longer lags (five years or more) such as may be 
encountered in a research-technology-launch cost relationship, the proportion of 
the lag time to the total time period examined would make it very difficult to 
detect any relationship. On the other hand, meaningful effects of perceptions 
and expectations regarding causal relationships could certainly influence the 
decisions with much shorter delays, and therefore be significant to this analysis. 
For example, if a decision maker was aware of a large influx in research activity, 
the expectation of resulting reductions in launch costs might make the 
investment more appealing. In any case, subsequent research may consider 
dealing with this phenomenon by examining phase plane diagrams with variable 
time shifts incorporated.
Implications of Results 
This research contributes the two hypotheses stated above, and the 
accompanying methodological framework, for eliminating some of the 
uncertainty in large-scale decision environments characterized by complex
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dynamic relationships and uncertainty regarding future behavior and factors 
which influence that behavior. It integrates the theoretical language and analytic 
processes of nonlinear dynamics and chaos theory into the language of decision 
theory and forecasting (a continuation of that begun by Priesmeyer). The  
methodology also encourages a holistic view of decision systems, as opposed to 
prediction based on extrapolation of a small number of statistical performance 
indicators. Validation of the hypotheses will add to the body of knowledge in 
decision theory and forecasting, providing additional tools for use in eclectic 
approaches.
A corollary contribution of the research is that the methodology can be 
used to support some of the widely used forecasting methodologies.
Approaching the decision environment holistically and focusing on the dynamic 
interactions between factors that affect that environment can support the 
development of scenarios by illustrating what is and is not likely to occur within 
certain timeframes. It can also support “what i f  and sensitivity analyses through 
its attention to the dynamics of the system.
The methodology described herein has applicability in decision 
environments other than that investigated in this study. It would be particularly 
applicable in advanced technological domains, rapidly growing industries and 
international endeavors, all of which are characterized by dynamic interactions 
that have not matured enough to be predictable.
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The implications for future research are primarily concerned with the 
issue of validation. The traditional method of validation for a methodology which 
treats uncertainty in the future is to “live out” that future, chronicle the outcomes, 
and see if they lie within some tolerance bandwidth of the outcomes predicted.
In a dynamic environment characterized by primary uncertainty, however, those 
tolerance bands lose their significance because the “ground rules” keep 
changing. The utility of the methodology developed herein is not its ability to 
predict the future, but its ability to shed light on the dynamic relationships which 
shape the future. The process of validation, then, must be a continuously 
unfolding and evolving process similar to that employed in robust sequential 
decision making. In the robust decision process, adjustments are made at 
specific decision points using knowledge acquired since the previous decision to 
develop a strategy which retains the greatest number of potentially good 
outcomes. In validating the hypotheses posed herein, additional data points can 
be added to the phase planes and uncertainty indices as future events unfold, 
and compared to the predictions generated. Some of the limitations of this 
study, which have been previously discussed, can be overcome in the design of 
subsequent data gathering efforts.
There are three additional recommendations for future research. This 
study, by design, relied entirely on qualitative data. For some of the factors 
(launch activity and launch cost, for example) some quantitative data exists. For
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other factors, related statistics which act as “indicators" of historical performance 
(NASA funding levels for space related research as an indicator of the level of 
academic research, for example). In future research efforts, these indicators 
should be incorporated into the raw data used to generate the marginal change 
data, or used as a basis of discussion if a method of consensus is used in the 
data gathering process.
The second recommendation addresses the validity issue through 
duplicity of findings. To accomplish this, it is recommended that the 
methodology be employed in a different research venue and the results 
compared. If the second study produces analytical results which appear 
reasonable (remembering that validity is not directly demonstrable), then 
credence is lent to the methodology.
The third recommendation is to attempt to develop a method of probing 
more deeply into the richness of interactions among the decision factors. The 
research described herein limited its investigation to pair-wise interactions. 
Future research could investigate higher order combinations of factors (three, 
four or five at a time).
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS
This research has been characterized as Exploratory Applied Research. 
The value of this type of research rests in its external validity - its ability to be 
generalized to other venues of investigation and practice. It is believed that the 
methodological process developed herein has broad generalizability.
The methodology is considered the primary contribution of the research. 
One of its benefits is that it provides a framework under which complex 
relationships can be observed and analyzed via patterns generated in phase 
space. This enables analysis of multifaceted decision scenarios by people who 
need not be expert in all of the relevant domains and disciplines. There are, 
however, some elements of the methodology which are critical to the outcome of 
the process. They warrant some further comment.
The most critical process element is the ability to enlist the respondents in 
such a manner that all relevant sectors of the environment are represented. The 
amount of effort that was expended to design the survey instrument and solicit 
respondents for the research was justified. In retrospect, the sample was still 
not considered sufficient to accomplish more than the proposition of two
hypotheses based on the analysis of data.
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The quality of respondents is also critical. In a less complex and more 
mature environment than the one selected for this research, this might not be as 
important an issue. In the case of commercial space launch infrastructure, 
however, most of the activity has been concentrated in the past decade. 
Consequently, finding individuals from all the required sectors who have been 
participants for that length of time was somewhat problematic.
In order to obtain a diversity of responses, the research was performed 
without any planned collaboration among respondents. But diversity became a 
double edged sword. On the one hand, the number of different viewpoints was 
maximized, which was beneficial. On the other hand, there was a likelihood that 
some sampling error was introduced by differing interpretations of the questions 
by the respondents. As stated in Chapter 4, it is the opinion of the researcher 
that some up-front cooperative activity among respondents would produce a 
more reliable set of data.
In actuality, there were instances of unintended respondent collaboration 
in the research. It was learned during follow-up contact that many of the 
respondents were acquainted with one another. Some of those relationships 
were known beforehand, but many were not. Of the eight responses used for 
analysis there was some degree of collaboration. In one instance, a survey 
diskette which was sent to one respondent was returned by another (the 
diskettes were coded for identification). It was later learned that both parties
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had supplied information in certain areas, and that some discussion had taken 
place. This in no way invalidated the data. On the contrary, this particular 
response was observed to have far more substantiating ancillary data than any 
of the other responses. The emergence of these relationships among 
respondents reinforces the observation that in this venue, there is a very small 
universe of potential respondents from which to draw a sample. The need for a 
methodology which maximizes sample size and the amount of information 
derived from each respondent becomes evident.
The hypotheses presented in Chapter 4 emerged as a result of looking at 
the numerical and pictorial/graphical data in a number of different ways. It is not 
the contention of the researcher that these hypotheses constitute an exhaustive 
list of the possibilities. The two that are presented meet the criteria of 
supporting actual observations of the environment (that is, they seem 
reasonable in light of current events), and of being of practical use to the 
decision maker.
To provide closure to the research and its outcomes, a look back at the 
initial research question posed in Chapter 1 is necessary. That question, 
restated, is: “Should an investment be made to develop infrastructure to support 
commercial space launch activities?" This research did not arrive at a simple 
“yes or no” answer to that question, and was not intended to, since the final 
decision in a real situation would also encompass factors relevant to the
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decision maker and his or her goals, objectives and risk tolerance. What does
emerge from the analysis are two statements regarding such an investment
which, with consideration given to the stated limitations of the research, could be
used to assist in the strategic decision process.
“If one were to invest in space launch infrastructure, the best return 
on investment is likely to come from activities which directly 
contribute to the reduction of launch costs.”
“In consideration of such an investment, one would be well advised 
to adjust the desired rate of return upward to compensate for the 
increasing level of uncertainty and risk in the environment.”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
REFERENCES
Aiginger, Karl (1987). Production and Decision Theory Under Uncertainty. New 
York: B. Blackwell.
Allaire, Yvan and Firsirotu, Mihaela (1989). “Coping with Strategic Uncertainty.” 
Sloan Management Review. (v30, Spring), 7-16.
Allais, M. and Hagen, 0 . (1979). Expected Utility Hypotheses and the Allais 
Paradox. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
Armstrong, J. Scott (1985). Lona-Ranae Forecasting: From Crystal Ball to 
Computer. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Arrow, Kenneth J. and Hurwicz, Leonid (1972). “An Optimality Criterion for 
Decision Making Under Ignorance,” in C.F. Carter and J.E. Ford, eds. 
Uncertainty and Expectations in Economics. Oxford, Great Britain: Basil 
Blackwell.
Ascher, William and Overholt, William (1983). Strategic Planning and
Forecasting: Political Risk and Economic Opportunity. New York: John 
Wiley and Sons.
Ashby, W. Ross (1956). An Introduction to Cybernetics. London: Methuen & 
Co., Ltd.
Beenhakker, H.L. (1975). Capital Investment Planning for Management and 
Engineering. Rotterdam, Netherlands: Rotterdam University Press.
Bolger, F. and Wright, G. (1993). “Coherence and Calibration in Expert 
Probability Judgment.” Omega. (v21, no. 6, November), 629-644.
Bossert, James L. (1991). Quality Function Deployment: A
Practitioner's Approach. New York: ASQC Quality Press.
Bullard, James and Butler, Alison (1993). “Nonlinearity and Chaos in Economic 
Models: Implications for Policy Decisions.” The Economic Journal.
(v103, July), 849-867.
95
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
96
Cartwright, T. J. (1991). “Planning and Chaos Theory.” Journal of the American 
Planning Association. (v57, No. 1, Winter), 44-56.
Clemen, Robert T. (1991). Making Hard Decisions: An Introduction to Decision 
Analysis. Boston: PWS-Kent Publishing Co.
Cohen, Michele and Jaffrey, Jean-Yves (1980). "Rational Behavior Under 
Complete Ignorance.” Econometrica. (v48, no. 5, July) 1281-1294.
Cohen, P. (1985). Heuristic Reasoning About Uncertainty - An Al Approach. 
Boston, MA: Pitman.
Crichton, Michael (1990). Jurassic Park. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
Dagsvik, John K. (1994). “Discrete and Continuous Choice, Max-stable
Processes, and Independence from Irrelevant Attributes.” Econometrica. 
(v62, no. 5, September) 1179-1205.
Dixit, Avinash and Pindyck, Robert (1995). “The Options Approach to Capital 
Investment.” Harvard Business Review. (v73, no. 3, May) 105-115.
Dyckman, T.R., Smidt, S., and McAdams, A.K. (1969). Management Decision 
Making Under Uncertainty. London: The MacMillan Company.
Easton, Allan (1980). Complex Managerial Decisions Involving Multiple 
Objectives. Huntington, NY: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Co.
Eoyang, Carson K. (1978). “Requisite Variety in Organizations." Proceedings of 
the 22nd Annual North American Meeting of the Society for General 
Systems Research. Washington, D.C., February 13-15.
Fishburn, Peter C. (1970). Utility Theory for Decision Making. New York: John 
Wiley and Sons.
Fishburn, Peter C. (1982). The Foundation of Expected Utility. Dordrecht, 
Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Friend, J.K. and Jessop, W.N. (1977). Local Government and Strategic Choice. 
2nd Edition. New York: Pergamon Press, Ltd.
Gleick, James (1988). Chaos: Making a New Science. New York: Viking 
Press.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
97
Gul, Faruk and Lantto, Outi (1990). “Betweenness Satisfying Preferences and 
Dynamic Choice.” Journal of Economic Theory. (v52, October), 162-177.
Gupta, Shiv K. and Rosenhead, Jonathan (1968). “Robustness in Sequential 
Investment Decisions.” Management Science. (v15, October), B-18 - 
B-29.
Henrion, Max, M. Granger Morgan, Indira Nair, and Charles Wiecha (1986). 
“Evaluating an Information System for Policy Modeling and Uncertainty 
Analysis.” Journal of the American Society for Information Science. (v37, 
Sept.), 319-330.
Hey, John D. (1993). “Dynamic Decision Making Under Uncertainty: An
Experimental Study of the Dynamic Competitive Firm,” Oxford Economic 
Papers. (v45, no. 1, January) 58-82.
Hill, Percy, Bedau, Hugo, Chechile, Richard, Crochetiere, William, Kellerman, 
Barbara, Ounjian, Daniel, Pauker, Stephen, Pauker, Susan, and Rubin, 
Jeffrey. (1979). Making Decisions: A Multidiciplinarv Introduction. 
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co.
Holloway, Charles A. (1979). Decision Making Under Uncertainty: Models and 
Choices. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Jedamus, Paul and Frame, Robert (1969). Business Decision Theory. New 
York: McGraw-Hill.
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979). "Prospect Theory - Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk." Econometrica. (v47, n2), 263-291.
Kami, Edi (1985). Decision Making Under Uncertainty: The Case of State- 
Dependent Preferences. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Kelsey, David (1993). “Choice Under Partial Uncertainty.” International 
Economic Review. (v34, no. 2, May) 297-308.
Lawler, Andrew (1993). “Space Station Chaos Jeopardizes Coalition.” Space 
News. (v4, no. 10, March 8-14), 1,20.
Loomes, G. and Sudgen, R. (1982). "Regret Theory - An Alternative Theory of 
Rational Choice Under Uncertainty." Economic Journal. (v92, n368), 805- 
824.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
98
Machina, M.J. (1982). "Expected Utility Analysis Without the Independence 
Axiom." Econometrica. (v50, March) 277-323.
March, J.G. and Simon, H.A. (1958). Organizations. New York: Wiley.
Mason, David H. and Wilson, Robert G. (1987). "Future Mapping: A New 
Approach to Managing Strategic Uncertainty." Planning Review. (v15, 
May-June) 20-25.
Mehrez, A., Muzumdar, M., Acar, W., and Weinroth, G. (1995). “A Petri Net
Model View of Decision Making: An Operational Management Analysis.” 
Omeoa. (v23, no. 1, February) 63-78.
Mendell, Jay S., ed. (1985). Nonextraoolative Methods in Business Forecasting. 
Westport, Conn.: Quorum Books.
Middleton, Bruce S. (1995). “Launch Market Forecasts Often Mislead.” Aviation 
W eek and Space Technology. (v143, no. 2, July 10) 68.
Newbold, Paul (1986). Principles of Management Science. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Patton, Michael Quinn (1990). Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods. 
London: Sage Publications.
Prelec, Drazen and Loewenstein, George (1991). "Decision Making Over Time 
and Under Uncertainty: A Common Approach." Management Science. 
(v37, July), 770-786.
Priesmeyer, H. Richard (1992). Organizations and Chaos. Westport, Conn.: 
Quorum Books.
Priesmeyer, H. Richard and Baik, Kibok (1989). “Discovering the Patterns of 
Chaos.” Planning Review. (Nov. - Dec.), 14-21, 47.
Prigogine, Ilya and Stengers, Isabelle (1984). Order Out of Chaos: Man’s New 
Dialog With Nature. Toronto: Bantam New Age Books.
Radford. K.J. (1981). Modern Managerial Decision Making. Reston, VA: 
Prentice-Hall.
Raiffa, Howard (1968). Decision Analysis. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
99
Richards, Diana (1990). “Is Strategic Decision Making Chaotic?” Behavioral 
Science. (v35), 219-232.
Rosenhead, Jonathan, Elton, Martin, and Gupta, Shiv K. (1972). “Robustness 
and Optimality as Criteria for Strategic Decisions.” Operational Research 
Quarterly. (v23, no. 4), 413-431.
Savage, L.J. (1954). Foundations of Statistics. New York: Wiley.
Sayers, Chera L. (1991). “Statistical Inference Based Upon Non-linear Science.” 
European Economic Review. (v35), 306-312.
Schniedler, D. (1989). "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility Without 
Additivity." Econometrica. (v57, May), 571-587.
Smilor, Raymond W. and Feeser, Henry R. (1991). “Chaos and the
Entrepreneurial Process: Patterns and Policy Implications for Technology 
Entrepreneurship.” Journal of Business Venturing. (v6), 165-172.
Stacey, Ralph (1993). “Strategy as Order Emerging From Chaos.” Long Rang 
Planning. (v26, February), 10-17.
Stigler, G.J. (1950). 'The Development of Utility Theory: I; II." Journal of
Political Economy. (v58, August, 1950) 307-327, (October, 1950) 373- 
396.
Thompson, Arthur A. and Strickland, A. J. (1981). Strategy and Policy:
Concepts and Cases. Plano, Texas: Business Publications, Inc.
Tonn, B. (1986). "Using Possibility Functions for Long-Term Environmental 
Planning." Futures. (v18), 795-807.
Tonn, B. (1991). 'The Development of Ideas of Uncertainty Representation. 
(Research Policy and Review, part 34)." Environmental and Planning A. 
(v23, June), 783-812.
Wittrock, Bjorn (1979). “Long Range Forecasting and Policy Making: Options 
and Limits in Choosing a Future,” in Tom Whitson, ed. The Uses and 
Abuses of Forecasting. London, MacMillan Press, Ltd.
Yager, R.R. (1980). "Aspects of Possibilistic Uncertainty. "International Journal 
of Man-Machine Studies. (v12, no. 3), 283-298.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
APPENDIX A
LITERATURE AND CONTACTS USED AS INFORMAL DATA SOURCES
100




Space News. Army Times Publishing Company 
Washington Technology. TechNews, Inc.
Aerospace America. American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
Aviation Week and Space Technology. McGraw-Hill, Inc.
NASA Tech Briefs. National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Innovations. Virginia’s Center for Innovative Technology 
Space Technology Innovation. NASA Office of Space Access and Technology 
Technology Transfer Business. TechNews, Inc.
Discover. Time, Inc.
High Technology. Infotechnology Publishing Corp.
AIAA Student Journal. American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
NASA Spin-off. NASA Office of Commercial Programs 
Space FAX Daily. Space Age Publishing Company
Commercial Space Opportunities. NASA HQ, Office of Commercial Programs
Space Calendar. Space Age Publishing Company
Space. The Shephard Press
Inside Wallops. NASA Wallops Flight Facility
Reports and Documents
Design Challenges for Tomorrow’s Manned Launch Systems. NASA Langley Research 
Center
Human Transportation System Study Final Report. NASA Johnson Spaceflight Center
Human Transportation System Study Architecture Evaluation Tool. NASA Johnson 
Spaceflight Center and Lockheed Engineering and Services Co.
Launch System Study Final Report: A Demonstration of Robustness for Space
Transportation Architectures. Old Dominion University, Dept, of Engineering 
Management
Infrastructure Study (NAS 8-37588L Marshall Spaceflight Center and General Dynamics 
Space Systems Div.
Access to Space Study (Status Briefing ChartsL NASA Access to Space Steering 
Committee
U.S. Space Launch Systems. Navy Space Systems Activity
Research and Test Facilities for Development of Technologies and Experiments with 
Commercial Applications. NASA Goddard Spaceflight Center
Virginia’s Initiative for Commercial Space Launch Support at Wallops. Virginia’s Center 
for Innovative Technology
In-Space Operations: Going to Work in Space. NASA Langley Research Center
Space: America’s New Competitive Frontier. The Business-Higher Education Forum
Commercial Titan Briefing (Commercial Space Risk and Insurance Symposium). Martin 
Marietta Commercial Titan, Inc.
Pavload Processing Facilities and Support for Commercial ELV and Shuttle Launches. 
Astrotech Space Operations, L.P.
A Survey on the Opinions and Attitudes of Investors on Commercial Space Initiatives. 
KPMG Peat Marwick
Accessing Space: A Catalog o Process. Eouipment and Resources for Commercial 
Users. NASA HQ, Office of Commercial Programs
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Overview of Policy. Market and Technology Options for Commercial Reusable Re-entry 
Satellites. NASA Ames, Office of Commercial Programs and Stanford University 
Commercial. Delta Launch Vehicle (Briefing to Commercial Space Risk and Insurance 
Symposium. McDonnell Douglas 
The Atlas Family: Commercial Launch Services. General Dynamics Commercial 
Launch Services
Big. Dumb Boosters: A Low-Cost Space Transportation Option?. U.S. Congress, Office 
of Technology Assessment 
Commercial Space Ventures: A Financial Perspective. U.S. Department of Commerce 
Virginia Space Resource Directory. Virginia’s Center for Innovative Technology 
A Post Cold W ar Assessment of U.S. Space Policy. Vice President’s Space Policy 
Advisory Board
Final Report to the President on the U.S. Space Program f1993V National Space 
Council
The Future of the U.S. Space Industrial Base. Vice President’s Space Policy Advisory 
Board
The Future of the U.S. Space Launch Capability. Vice President’s Space Advisory Board
1992 Research and Technology Report. Goddard Space Flight Center
United States Space Directory (19931. Space Publications
NASA Spinoff (1991.1992). NASA HQ, Office of Commercial Programs
Virginia Focuses on Space. Virginia’s Center for Innovative Technology
Commercial Experiment Transporter (COMET) technical and management 
reports, Center for Space Transportation and Applied Research 
Final Report (to CIT): The Center for Commercial Space Infrastructure. Old Dominion 
University, Department of Engineering Management 
Commercial Space Infrastructure Needs Assessment Survey: Report of Findings. Old 
Dominion University, School of Business and Public Administration
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Contacts Established (bv Infrastructure Sector)
Commercial Space Industry
Name
Mr. Roy Slinchum 
Mr. Dm Qazi 
Mr. Frederick Perkins 
Ms. Bonnie Morris 
Ms. Christine Gatewood 
Mr. Hollister Cantus 
Dr. Phillip Cheney 
Mr. Dick Uliman 
Mr. Barry Abzug 
Mr. John Mehoves 
Mr. Otto Hoemig 
Dr. Richard Fleeter 
Mr. Larry Yermack 
Mr. Ron Hodge 
Mr. Jesse Moore 
Mr. Ed Yablonski 
Mr. Dave Johnson 
Mr. Robert Cowls 
Mr. Theodore Nanz 
Mr. Sam Mihara 
Ms. Bonnie Soodik 
Mr. Steve Lawson 
Mr. R. S. Sapp 
Dr. Mourice Miller 
Mr. Robert Young 
Mr. Ken Johnson 
Mr. Robert Hager 
Mr. Robert Horowitz 
Mr. Richard Grant 
Ms. Elyse Nicholson 
Mr. Henry Dinenno 
Ms. Mary Lou Kromer 
Ms. Ginger Emry 
Mr. Don Carter 
Mr. Paul Hirsch 
Mr. Robert Glaysher 
Mr. Mark Schwene 
Mr. Bill Moore 
Mr. Steve Pilcher 
Mr. Paul Bachar 
Mr. Fred Stang 
Ms. Elaine Hinsdale 
Mr. Ed Yablonski 
Mr. Dom Mack 
Mr. Ivor Knight 





Standard Space Platforms Corp. 
Stanford Telecommunications, Inc. 
General Dynamics 







Fairchild Space and Defense Corp. 
SPOT Image Corp.
Ball Corp.
American Mobile Satellite Corp.
CTA, Inc.
McDonnell Douglas Space Systems Co. 
SPOT Image Corp.
McDonnell Douglas Space Systems Co. 
McDonnell Douglas Space Systems Co. 
Thiokol Corp.
Lockheed Corp.
Lockheed Engineering and Services Co. 
Lockheed Corp.
GE Astrospace
Boeing Missiles and Space Group 
GE Astrospace








Hughes Space and Communications Co. 
Hughes Space and Communications Co. 
Hughes Space and Communications Co. 
Hughes Space and Communications Co. 
Space Systems/Loral 
Grumman Aerospace Corp.
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Commercial Space Industry (Cont'd.t
Name Organization
Mr. Alvin Reeser Spacehab, Inc.
Mr. Thomas Zakrzewski Nichols Research Corp.
Mr. Phillip Bruce Space Applications Corp.
Mr. Mark Daniels EER Systems Corp.
Mr. Tom Ramberg Space Applications Corp.
Mr. Chris Bourassa Storm Integration, Inc.
Mr. Bill Grieser Storm Integration, Inc.
Mr. David Sterling Motorola, Inc.
Mr. R. D. Anderson Pratt & Whitney
Mr. Rick Andrews KPMG Peat Marwick
Mr. John Jaques Martin Marietta Corp.
Mr. Kurt Bassett Martin Marietta Civil Space & Communications Co.
Mr. John Lent Martin Marietta Corp.
Mr. John DeGeneres Martin Marietta Manned Space Systems Group
Mr. Feltus Kennedy Martin Marietta Manned Space Systems Group
Mr. Robert Beale General Electric Co.
Mr. Bill Benner Unisys Corp.
Mr. Henry Beny Engineering, Inc.
Mr. Francis Bloomcamp McDonnell Douglas Corp.
Mr. H. L. Brewer Northrup Corp.
Mr. James Bums Centel Cellular Co.
Mr. Joseph Casas Spacetec Ventures, Inc.
Mr. James Cannon Technology Applications, Inc.
Mr. Richard Coffman BDM International, Inc.
Mr. Richard Cochran Northrup Worldwide Aircraft Services, Inc.
Mr. Ted Cors L T  Aerospace and Defense Co.
Mr. William Crowe Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc.
Mr. J. E. Cvik Raytheon, Co.
Ms. Christine DeHaven The Boeing Co.
Mr. Ben DeVane Westinghouse Electric Corp.
Mr. Thomas Ehrenberger E-Systems
Mr. Donald Elliott Lockheed Corp.
Mr. James Emory Litton Data Systems
Mr. Bill Fedor The Boeing Co.
Mr. Bruce Ferguson Orbital Sciences Corp.
Mr. Terry Feist General Electric Co.
Mr. Doyle Franklin UNISYS Corp.
Mr. George Golden Rockwell International/North American Aircraft
Mr. Patrick Haney Lockheed Corp.
Mr. E. J. Higgins Teledyne Hastings-Raydist
Mr. Robert Kelly Lockheed Engineering
Mr. Robin Kozelka Loral Electronic Systems
Mr. John Langford Aurora Flight Sciences Corp.
Dr. Byron Lichtenberg Payload Systems, Inc.
Mr. R. A. Magnum McDonnell Douglas Corp.
Mr. Kevin McCoy General Dynamics Corp.
Mr. Roy Myers Rockwell International
Mr. Landon Overby Contel Federal Systems
Mr. Thomas Pearson EER Systems Corp.
Mr. Howard Pedolsky Orbital Systems Ltd.
Mr. Pete Perkins TRW  Space and Technology Group
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Commercial Space Industry fCont’d.)
NASA
Name Organization
Mr. Duane Perry Allied-Signal Aerospace Co.
Mr. Richard Price Grumman Corp.
Mr. Donald Quinn Hughes Aircraft Co.
Mr. Mandell Reynolds Computer Sciences Corp.
Mr. Vincent Schultz Booz Allen & Hamilton, Inc.
Mr. Scott Stith General Electric Government Services Co.
Mr. Richard Stoessner Sikorsky Aircraft Co.
Mr. Paul Tobin Wyle Laboratories
Mr. Moffette Tharpe EER Systems
Mr. Marco Zanetti Martin Marietta Corp
Mr. Edward Haugland General Research Corp.
Mr. Ernest Briel BRPH Architects-Engineers
Dr. Thomas Wright EER Systems
Mr. Jim Lojocono SKW Corporation
Mr. Wesley Weriing EER Systems
Mr. Michael Kiya SKW Corporation
Mr. Wayne Finger Reynolds, Smith and Hills, Inc.
Dr. Marshall Kaplan Veda Incorporated
Mr. Bill Derdock Lockheed Space Operations Co.
Mr. Ron Sabatino Lockheed Space Operations Co.
Mr. Ernest Bedegrew Lockheed Missiles and Space Co.
Mr. Edward Matthews Conatec, Inc.
Mr. David McGowan Orbital Sciences Corp.
Mr. Brian Hughes American Rocket Company
Mr. Robert Mellor Lockheed Space Operations Co.
Mr. Dennis McGinley AlliedSignal, Inc.
Mr. Gene Steiger Lockheed Missiles and Space Co.
Mr. Art Waite BRPH Architects-Engineers
Mr. Art Perry American Space Technology, Inc.
Mr. Stephen Morgan Starsys Global Positioning, Inc.
Mr. Jack Koletty AlliedSignal, Inc.
Mr. Richard Scredon Veda, Incorporated
Dr. George Garrison 
Mr. Joe Pawlick 
Mr. Sidney Pauls 
Mr. John Emond 
Mr. Ray Whitten 
Mr. Charles Cockrell 
Mr. Larry Rowell 
Mr. Ray Stanley 
Mr. Terry Potterton 
Mr. Ed Dean 
Mr. Bruce Underwood 
Mr. Sidney Pauls 
Mr. John Emond 
Mr. Keith Koehler
Center for Space Transportation and Applied Research
Center for Space Transportation and Applied Research
NASA Langley Research Center
NASA Office of Commercial Programs
NASA HQ, Office of Commercial Programs
NASA Langley Research Center
NASA Langley Research Center
NASA Wallops Flight Facility
NASA Wallops Flight Facility
NASA Langley Research Center
NASA Wallops Flight Facility
NASA Langley Research Center
NASA HQ, Office of Commercial Programs
NASA Wallops Flight Facility
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Federal. State and Local Government Agencies
Name Organization
Mr. James Cames 
Mr. Charles Kline 
Dr. Mario Fiori 
Mr. Richard Scott 
Mrs. Stephanie Myers 
Mr. E. W . Davis 
Mr. Randy Davis 
Mr. Julius Denton 
Mr. Arthur Fisher 
Ms. Donna Girardot 
Mr. Henry Hofheimer 
Mr. Terry Holzheimer 
Mr. John Hombeck 
Ms. Connie Long 
Mr. Alvin Tompkins 
Mr. Greg Wingfield 
Dr. Dana Hamel 
Capt. Robert Masten 
Col. Edward Nicastri 
Ms. Cathleen Magennis 
Mr. Peter Fitzpatrick 
Mr. James Witherspoon 
Mr. Michael Miller 
Mr. Jack Bonniwell 
Mr. Keith Bull 
Hon. Herbert H. Bateman 
Ms. Susan Berry 
Ms. Patricia Spurlock 
Mr. Pat Ladner 
Mr. Daniel Kuennen 
Mr. Wayne Sterling 
Mr. Paul Berge 
Ms. Marsha Schachtel 
Ms. Shana Dale 
Mr. Jeff Hofgard 
Mr. Bill Meyer 
Maj. James Knauf
Department of Defense Energy Directorate
U.S. DoT, Office of Commercial Space Transportation
U.S. Department of Energy
U.S. DoT, Office of Commercial Space Transportation
U.S. DoT, Office of Commercial Space Transportation
VA Dept, of Economic Development
Hampton Roads Chamber of Commerce
VA Peninsula Economic Development Center
Eastern Shore of VA Economic Development Comm.
Hampton Roads Chamber of Commerce
Future of Hampton Roads
VA Dept, of Economic Development
Hampton Roads Chamber of Commerce
Hampton Roads Chamber of Commerce
VA Peninsula Chamber of Commerce
Forward Hampton Roads
VA Center for Public/Private Initiatives
U. S. Naval Weapons Station
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
VA Dept, of Economic Development
VA Dept, of Economic Development
VA Department of Economic Development
Virginia's Center for Innovative Technology
Eastern Shore of VA Economic Development Comm.
Eastern Shore of VA Economic Development Comm.
U.S. Congress
Office of Sen. John Warner
Office of Sen. Charles Robb
Alaska Aerospace Development Corp.
MD Rural Development Center 
VA Department of Economic Development 
Accomack-Northampton Planning District Commission 
MD Dept, of Economic and Employment Development 
U.S. Congress, Science, Space and Tech. Committee 
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy 
MD Dept, of Economic and Employment Development 
USAF, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Acquisition
International Entities
Mr. Wang Yan 
Mr. Chris Faranetta 
Mr. Jeff Manber
China National Aero-Technology Import/Export Corp. 
NPO Energia 
NPO Energia
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Academic and Research Centers
Name Organization
Ms. Barbara Hale 
Dr. Marianna Long 
Dr. Charles Bostian 
Mr. Donald Bishop 
Mr. C. L. Britt 
Mr. Suman Ganguly 
Mr. J. G. Bowman 
Dr. William Glenn 
Mr. David Cummings 
Dr. John Logsdon
Center for Cell Research
Center for Macromolecular Crystallography
Center for Commercial Space Communications
Center for Space and Advanced Technology
Research Triangle Institute
Center for Remote Sensing
Institute of Long Range Studies
Space Communications Technology Center
Universities Space Research Association
Space Policy Institute
Legal Providers
Ms. Janice Bellucci 
Mr. F. Kenneth Schwetje
Media




Attorney at Law 
Aegis Research Corp.
Virginian Pilot and Ledger Star 
Space News
Space Vest Management Group
Associations and Omanizations
Ms. Joanne Padrone 
Ms. Mary Sandy
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
Virginia Aerospace Business Roundtable
Insurance Providers
Mr. Frederick Hauck international Technical Underwriters, Inc.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
APPENDIX B 
SURVEY INSTRUMENT  
SOFTWARE SCREENS AND RESPONDENT INSTRUCTIONS
108


















COMMERCIAL SPACE I 
INFRASTRUCTURE I
In support of a  Ph.D. Dissertation in Engineering Management
W ayne Woodhams 
Department of Engineering Management 
Old Dominion University 
Norfolk. Virginia 23529  
(8 0 4 )6 8 3 -5 4 7 8
CLICK HERE TO BEGIN SURVEY ]
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If operating from a floppy disk drive, you must identify the drive you are using (A or B) by
clicking on the appropriate button below.
iDisk Drive = A: j
D isk Drive = B: O
If this is your first time through the survey, or if you are unsure of how to 
proceed, click on the INSTRUCTIONS button below for a brief tutorial.
If you wish to bypass the tutorial and start the survey now, click on the
START button below.
IN STR U C TIO N S STA R T
TUTORIAL
This computerized data gathering instrument was custom designed for this 
application, using Microsoft Visual Basic 3.0.
Note that this program will not run unless the DOS SHARE program is executing. If it is not part 
of your ATTOEXEC.BAT file, you must exit Windows and type "SHARE/L:500" at the DOS prom pt 
hit ENTER, and restart Windows.
This survey requests that the respondent supply data in one or more of ten topic 
areas relating to commercial space activities. You were invited to participate 
because of your knowledge in at least one of these areas. Please feel free to 
respond in any additional areas in which you feel comfortable.
Also, please feel free to collaborate with colleagues in responding. If a colleague 
wishes to respond individaully, please provide his/her name and E-mail (or 
postal) address in the final comments section of the survey, or make a copy of 
this transmittal for his/her use.
Each screen has command buttons like the ones you see below. Clicking your 
mouse button on any of them allows you to control the program execution. Click 
on the CONTINUE button to proceed, or the QUIT button if you wish to stop here 





















Each data entry screen asks a question relating to the performance of some factor relating to 
commercial space, and how it has varied oyer the past ten years. The responses requested are 
qualitative rather than quantitative and are provided by you in a  graphic format such as the one 
shown below. The levels are normalized to a scale of 1 to 10.
W hen responding, first select the year in which the greatest level of the particular factor has been 
observed, and rate that year as a "10". Then rate all other years in comparison.
Enter data by clicking your mouse when the pointer is where you wish on the grid. Try 
experimenting with the sample grid below.
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Above the data entry grid appears a bank of "Event" buttons like those below. Clicking on 
any one of them will open a screen that asks you to identify significant events associated 
with the year in question.
A very important use of the data will be to analyze maxima, minima and 
points of inflection, so please use the Event buttons to provide anv available 
information regarding those phenomena.
Note that the Event 
buttons are not active in 
this tutorial.
85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
IC O N flN UE]
Even Event Event Event Event Event Event Event Event Event




























Note that none of the buttons below are active except for CONTINUE.
To the right of the data entry grid are two additional buttons as 
shown to the right. Clicking on the DATA SO URCE button opens 
a screen that asks you to identify the source of any statistical 
data used to support your response.
Clicking on the COMMENT button opens a screen which allows 





The three command buttons which appear at the bottom of each data entry screen are 
shown below. Clicking on the NEXT SCREEN button opens the next data screen for 
use. Clicking on the SELECT SCREEN button opens a menu from which you can 
select any data screen to open. Clicking on the Q UIT button saves all data and ends 
the survey session. You may quit and restart as many times as you like without losing 
data.
NEXT SCREEN ] SELECT SCREEN 3 QUIT 1


















Even Event Event Event Event Event Event Event Event Event
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1 -




NEXT SCREEN j SELECT SCREEN 1 QUIT ]



















Data Entry Screen #1 
Data Entry Screen #2  
Data Entry Screen #3  
Data Entry Screen #4  
D ata Entry Screen #5  
Data Entry Screen #6  
Data Entry Screen #7  
Data Entry Screen #8  
Data Entry Screen #9  
D ata Entry Screen #10
W hat has been the relative level of small to mid-sized (500 to 0.000 lbs. to LEO) 
launch activity over the past 10 years?
How has the cost per pound of payload mass to LEO. for Expendable Launch 
Vehicles, varied  over the past 10 years?
How strongly has the legal/regulatory environment supported commercial space  
activities over the past 10 years?
How strongly has the federal administration supported commercial space  
activities over the past 10 years?
W hat has been the relative level of competition (how many small to mid-sized 
launch providers, world-wide) over the past 10 years?
W hat has been the relative level of new technology introduction for small to 
mid-sized ELV's and satellites over the past 10 years?
How supportive of space activities has the public been, over the past 10 years?
W hat has been the relative level of space-related academ ic research activity 
over the last 10 years?
How has NASA's support of commercial space varied over the past 10 years?  
How has DoD's support of commercial space varied over the past 10 years?



















DATA ENTRY SCREEN #1 - LAUNCH ACTIVITY
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DATA ENTRY SCREEN #2 - LAUNCH COSTS
n't* f

































DATA ENTRY SCREEN #3 - REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT




NEXT SCREEN 1 SELECT SCREEN ] QUIT ] 123

















DATA ENTRY SCREEN #4- POLITICAL SUPPORT




NEXT SCREEN ] SELECT SCREEN 1 QUIT ] 125















DATA ENTRY SCREEN #5 - COMPETITION





















DATA ENTRY SCREEN #6-TECHNOLOGY

































DATA ENTRY SCREEN #7 - PUBLIC OPINION
Even Event Event Event Event Event Event Event Event Event
DATA
SOURCE
C OM M ENT
85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
N EXT SCREEN ] SELECT SCREEN 1 QUIT ] W

















DATA ENTRY SCREEN #8 - ACADEMIC ACTIVITY
; ISM f te  - r-i l.a'K *V? 5 * ■' V-rsj.**'- ̂




NEXT SCREEN ] SELECT SCREEN ] QUIT ] 133
134


















DATA ENTRY SCREEN #9 - NASA SUPPORT
S’s; «




NEXT SCREEN ] SELECT SCREEN ] QUIT 1 135

















DATA ENTRY SCREEN #10 - DoD SUPPORT
■




NEXT SCREEN 1 SELECT SCREEN ] QUIT 1 co
- ' j

















DATA ENTRY SCREEN MENU
:To make a  selection, click on the button to the right of the desired entry screen. If this is 
your first time through the survey, it is recommended that you proceed sequentially through 
;all of the data screens to determine which of the questions you wish to answer.
Data Entry Screen #1 -  Launch Activity i
Data Etry Screen #2 -  Launch Costs O
Data Entry Screen #3 -  Regulatory Environment O
Data Entry Screen #4 -  Political Support O
Data Entry Screen #5 - Competition O
Data Entry Screen #6 -  Technology O
Data Entry Screen #7 -  Public Opinion Q
Data Entry Screen #8 -  Academic Activity O
Data Entry Screen #9 -  NASA Support O
Data Entry Screen #10 - DoD Support O
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Thank you for participating in this survey to support my dissertation 
research. The objective of the research is to contribute to the body of 
knowledge in strategic decision making in environments characterized by 
primary uncertainty and non-linear dynamic relationships. You were selected as 
a survey respondent because of your knowledge and/or interest in space launch 
activities. It is not anticipated that you will be able to respond in all ten of the 
information categories of the survey, but you are encouraged to respond in any 
area that you have some knowledge. Your responses will be kept confidential. 
Only aggregate data from all respondents will be presented in the final 
document.
The enclosed software was custom designed for this survey, using Visual 
Basic Version 3.0. It requires an IBM-compatible machine with MS-DOS Version 
3.1 or later and Microsoft Windows Version 3.0 or later running in standard or 
enhanced mode. Please note that with older hardware configurations having low 
processing rates and minimal memory capacity, the execution time for this and 
other Windows-based software products will increase drastically. If you have 
any problems running the software, please contact me by phone at the number 
listed below.
The MS-DOS SHARE.EXE program must also be running. If SHARE 
is not executed in your AUTOEXEC.BAT file, you must exit Windows and, at 
the DOS Prompt, type SHARE/L:500 then hit the Enter key, and then 
restart Windows.
The enclosed floppy diskette contains a "setup” program that will load the 
SURVEY1 program onto your hard drive and create an icon in the Windows 
Program Manager. To run the setup program, insert the diskette, start Windows, 
and use the File Manager to locate the setup.exe program on the floppy drive 
you are using. Double click your mouse on setup.exe. Setup will make a 
directory called S U R V E Y ! It is important that you do rot elect to change the 
directory name.
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The diskette supplied to you has been screened for all known 
viruses and none have been detected.
To run the program, simply double click on the SURVEY1 icon in the 
Windows Program Manager, and follow the directions. The program runs in a 
manner similar to other Windows applications.
A brief tutorial is included in the program. It contains important 
information which will facilitate your interaction with the software, and ensure the 
validity of the data you provide. If using the software for the first time, or unsure 
of how to proceed, please go through this tutorial.
Any time you quit the program, your responses will be saved to a data 
base resident on the floppy diskette. You can quit and restart as many times as 
you wish without losing data previously entered.
The final interactive screen in the program is a Summary Comments 
screen. It is accessed from the final Data Entry screen (No. 10). Any additional 
comments you have can be entered in text on this screen, and will be greatly 
appreciated.
When you are finished with the survey, simply return the diskette by mail 
in the envelope provided. If you wish to keep the software or pass it on to 
colleagues, additional copies of the diskettes can be made. It is best to copy 
prior to entering data. (Note that the program will not execute with the diskette 
removed from the drive.)
Wayne Woodhams Voice: (804) 683-5478
Department of Engineering Management FAX: (804) 683-5640
Old Dominion University 
Norfolk, VA 23529
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Survey Respondents Solicited, by Position
•  Manager, NASA Headquarters Commercial Programs Office
•  Assistant Administrator for Commercial Programs, NASA Field Activity
•  Former NASA Launch Vehicle Development Program Manager
•  Director, Space Communications Technology Center
• Associate Director, U.S. DoT Office of Commercial Space Transportation
•  Legislative Assistant for Space, U.S. Congress, Science, Space and Technology Committee
•  Policy Analyst, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
•  Launch Vehicle Program Manager, Large Aerospace Conglomerate
•  Senior Mechanical Engineer, Launch Vehicle Division, Mid-Sized Launch Vehicle and 
Satellite Developer
• Business Development Manager, Commercial Communications Satellite Developer
• Systems Engineer, Commercial Space Hardware and Services Provider
• Former General Manager of (Aerospace)Technology Transfer, State Government Agency
• Director, State-Sponsored Spaceport Activity
• Attorney At Law, Specializing in Space Law
•  Manager, Space Investment Group
• Director, Academic Space Research Association
• Director, Space Grant Consortium
• Editor, Space Periodical
• Director, Student Programs, Aerospace Professional Association
•  Space Policy Analyst
•  Commercial Space Insurance Underwriter
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Question 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
1 1.375 1.5 1.1875 1.5 1.25 1.75 1.75 3.875 10 5.5625
2 7.75 8.0625 8.5 8.75 8.9375 9.25 9.375 9.5625 9.5 10
3 6 6.125 6.625 7.5 8.5 9.5 10 9.0625 7.5 5.5
4 6.75 7.625 8.0625 8.75 9.1875 9.5 10 9.875 8 4
5 2.9375 2.9375 3 2.9375 5.9375 7.6875 8.6875 8.9375 9.25 10.0625
6 1.9375 4.5 6 7.5 8.3125 8.6875 9.9375 10 9.75 9.625
7 8.5625 8.4375 8.5625 8.9375 9.1875 9.1875 9.25 10.0625 10 10
8 8.4375 8.75 9 9.1875 9.1875 9.5625 9.9375 9.9375 8.6875 7.5625
9 4.9375 7.375 8.5 9.0625 9.5 10.0625 9.625 8.5625 6.5 1.5
10 0.5625 0.4375 0.375 0.4375 0.625 0.4375 0.375 2.4375 6.5 10.0625
Data Sources
Screen 1: "None - just guesses ”
Screen Comments
Screen 1: "Low end # confined to Scout until Pegasus, upper end # was Delta & Atlas"
Screen 2: "Little change since there were limited customers • curve should match inflation"
Screen 3: "DOT is the big player, they restricted their views to launch only until COMET"
Screen 6: "DOD didn't need small vehicles until $ crunch occurred, NASA just figured it out in 
’94"
Screen 7: "Visited NASA & DOD visitors centers all over the country - I've always found them 
crowded!"
Screen 10: "In a declining DOD budget, COMSPACE is now a potential source of income for 
DOD - strongly supported now."
"Summary Comments"
"Wayne, glad to help. These are my first guesses, backed up by experience but no data. The 
launch rates are a matter of record and are carried in Jane’s and the AIAA magazine, I just don't 
have the actual numbers handy. Hope my submission is a bit of help. Should you wish me to go 
back and dig up data to back up my assertions and "hip shots", let me know, I may have a bit 
more time in early March. It's interesting that you took such a wide payload weight, there have 
been launchers to service the upper weight needs but, when we started COMET, there were NO 
launchers on the market which were targeted for the 2000# bracket - if there were, we would 
have bought three!"
Good luck and let me know if I can be of any further help.
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Question 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
1 2.9375 2.9375 2.8125 3.5625 4.25 4.4375 4.1875 4.1875 4 3.875
2 4.9375 4.8125 4.75 4.9375 5.3125 5.5625 5.8125 5.75 6.25 6.6875
3 7.125 6.8125 6.25 5.875 6.125 6.4375 6.9375 5.875 4 2.5
4 4.0625 3.875 3.875 3.625 3.125 2.4375 1.8125 1.125 1 1.0625
5 2.0625 2.0625 2.125 1.9375 2.4375 2.6875 3.125 3.4375 3.3125 3.3125
6 1.0625 1.125 1.125 1.25 6.4375 4.0625 3.4375 6.1875 7.3125 8.1875
7 5 8.25 5.5625 5.375 4.875 4.375 4.25 2.6875 2.4375 2.625
8 7 6.9375 7.0625 6.875 6.125 5.1875 4.6875 4.4375 3.6875 3.5
9 3.0625 3.625 4.0625 3.75 3.1875 2.5625 2.1875 1.6875 1.25 0.9375
10 1.75 1.625 2.3125 3 3.75 3.625 3.6875 4.0625 4.25 4.875
Screen 6 Events
1989: "Introduction of Pegasus”
Screen Comments
Screen 3: T h e  changes of administration and space policy has affected Commercial Space. 
As Congress has grappled with remote sensing and launch vehicle issues, the support for 
Commercial Space has changed."
Screen 8: "Falloff of research due to SDI reduction and military reduction levels ”
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Question 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991____1392____1393____1934
1 -0.0625 -0.0625 •0.0625 0 0 0.125 0 0.0625 0.125
2 O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 8 8 8.0625 7.9375 8.0625 8 4 2.8125 2.8125
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Screen 4 Events
1986: "Established CCDS program"
1993: "CCDS Program Cut"
1994: "CCDS Program severely cut"
Screen 9 Events
1985: "Supported CCDS effort"
1986: "Supported CCDS effort”
1987: "Supported CCDS effort"
1988: "Supported CCDS effort"
1989: " Supported CCDS effort"
1990: "Reorganization placed CCDS program in jeopardy"
1991: "NASA's continued reorganization jeopardized CCDS program"
1992: "NASA's continued reorganization jeopardized CCDS program"
1993: "Cutbacks, reduced funding of CCDS program, number CCDSs reduced" 
1994: "NASA reorganization, cutbacks, CCDS program in jeopardy"
Screen 10 Events
1993: "TRP - good for commercial space (ARPA)"
1994: "TRP - good for commercial space (ARPA)"
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Screen Comments
Screen 10: "Good until Challenger. Bad after Challenger accident. Bad now."
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Respondent L-1-1
Question 1985 1986 1987 _ 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 19941 17b 2.1875 0.8125 1.1875 1.25 0.6875 1.3125 0.6875 0.8125 0.52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 03 1.75 1.625 1.5625 2.3125 2.125 2.6875 2.6875 3.1875 3.3125 34 3.6875 3.5 3.4375 5.3125 3.3125 3.3125 3.125 3.125 3.125 3.93755 4.9375 4.9375 4.875 4.8125 6 6 5.9375 5.9375 6 5.93756 1.9375 1.75 1.8125 1.8125 2 1.8125 1.875 1.875 1.8125 1.8757 4.9375 5.9375 4.8125 3.9375 2.875 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4375 2.43758 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 09 1.875 1.9375 1.8125 2.375 2.375 1.8125 1.875 1.8125 1.8125 1.7510 0.375 0.4375 0.375 0.6875 1.125 1.3125 1.75 1.875 2.4375 3
Summary Comments
"(Contact), DOT/OCST, (202) 366-2980"
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Question 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
1 0 0 0 0 2.75 6.625 6.8125 5.5625 4.1875 4.125
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 7.9375 5.4375 7.875 7.9375 7.875 7.8125
4 0 0 0 0 0 3.5625 3 2.875 4.3125 4.3125
5 0 0 0 0 0 4.625 6.1875 4.9375 7.9375 8.9375
6 0 0 0 0 4.9375 4.9375 4.9375 5.8125 6.9375 7.875
7 6.75 3.8125 3.5 3.1875 3.1875 3.125 3.0625 2.875 2.8125 2.5625
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 2 1.8125 2.875 1.875 1.8125 0.875 0.875 1.875 3.875 5
10 1 1 0.875 1.875 1.9375 1.375 1.25 1.25 2.875 6.375
Data Sources:
Screen 1: "Office records on commercial licensed launches”
Screen 2: "anecdotal"
Screen 3: "personal observation"
Screen 4: "personal observation"
Screen 5: "market studies, observation"
Screen 9: "personal observation, NASA statements"
Comments Screens
Screen 1: "only dealing with commercial licensed launches since first in 1989"
Screen 2: "incremental improvements in existing vehicles has brought some savings" 
Screen 3: ”1990 drop represents NASA taking their launches out of commercial"
Screen 4: "support has been mostly verbal, little action"
Screen 5: "new countries, new vehicles entering m arket"
Screen 8: "I don't really have much idea"
Screen 9: "marked change under Dan Goldin and budget pressure"
Screen 10: "they seem to have realized that post-cold war, commercial is wave of future"
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Question 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
1 7 1.9375 1.8125 2.4375 2.9375 4.375 4.6875 5.4375 6.0625 6.125
2 2.3125 2.125 1.8125 1.375 1.1875 1.3125 1.125 1.1875 1.5625 1.75
3 2 1.9375 5.4375 6.4375 6.25 6.3125 6.1875 6.875 7.625 8.4375
4 2.0625 2 2.5625 2.625 2.625 2.75 2.9375 4.25 4.5 5.0625
5 0.9375 0.875 1.4375 2.1875 3.0625 5.125 7 5.9375 5.5625 5.0625
6 1.0625 1.0625 0.9375 3 3.9375 4.5625 4.875 5.25 5.5 5.875
7 6.0625 5.5 3 2.625 2.25 1.8125 1.6875 1.6875 1.5625 1.6875
8 5.9375 1.1875 1.1875 1.1875 1.5 1.875 2.1875 2.5625 2.875 3.4375
9 4 0.9375 1 0.9375 0.9375 1.0625 1.1875 1.3125 1.375 1.375
10 1.875 1.8125 3 3.3125 3.5625 3.6875 4.0625 4.1875 4.4375 4.5625
Data Source Comments:
Screen 3:
"With the advent of the WARC and FCC "opening” of the radio spectrum, and the loosening of 
the DoD restrictions on use of hi-res imagery, the regulatory environment is vastly improved.”
Screen Comments 
Screen 1:
"A lot of "small spacecraft" were effectively carried into orbit via the shuttle, prior to 
Challenger. The attached payloads program has been a low-level-of-effort, but successful NASA 
program ~  one of the very few bright spots in the NASA commercial mix."
Screen 2:
"This varies significantly for secondary vs. dedicated launch costs. Secondary costs are 
very low; dedicated launcher costs have stabilized at or around $10-15 million per launch, less 
with Russian rockets. Big problem today is cost of launch insurance - a significant portion of the 
total mission cost!"
Screen 3:
"With the advent of the WARC and FCC rules for Big and Little LEOs, and the lifting of 
restrictions on hi-res imagery, regulatory issues support commercial space are extremely 
favorable today."
Screen 4:
" Federal policy moved from "benign neglect" in the early 80s, to one of strong support. 
Support came mostly from DARPA and FCC, not NASA. In general, NASA remains hostile to 
commercial space, and small space in particular. Note how many missions, like Clementine, Big 
and Little LEOs are completely devoid of NASA support. To NASA, commercial space remains 
materials processing and spin-offs, and maybe ACTS, too. Note how NASA screwed up the 
COMET program."
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Screen 5:
" First, there was only shuttle and Ariane. Then came a bunch of "non-real" companies, 
like E-Prime. Then OSC with Pegasus and Taurus, followed by International Microspace, Ariane 
ASAP ring, and growth in large commercial rockets, entry of China. With fall of Soviet Union, 
Russian rockets became available, and big companies entered the fray, such as Lockheed, with 
LLV and the LKE. Then, a few drop-outs, like CTA (bought, then discarded International 
Microspace), Conatech, EER, and others. There are now only a few small satellite launch 
services providers, but the credibility of the remaining players is pretty good."
Screen 6:
"Many new and innovative technologies have been developed in support of small space. 
The Pegasus design used many new approaches, including synthetic wing and highly automated 
booster manufacture. Many advances have also found there way into the spacecraft, such as 
Orbcomm small batteries, STARSYS advanced CDMA communications filter, and others, 
enabling smaller and small payloads to be very, very capable."
Screen 7:
"Following the Challenger disaster, the public's support of "space" has become almost 
non-existent. However, despite this era of budget-cutting worldwide, allowed by public apathy in 
govt space programs, industry has re-awakened to see many possibilities in communications 
and hi-resolution remote sensing."
Screen 8:
"Academic space research of a commercial nature, is making a slow but steady recovery 
from the Challenger disaster. It takes years for academic projects to be decided upon and 
funded. Also, since business in pursuing commercial space activity more vigorously than gov't, 
that is "where the action is," and business-university relationships for R&D are precarious, at 
best, and often aren't fruitful for the company."
Screen 9:
"NASA's disdain for the commercial space community can be best seen in the 
abolishment of "Code C," the office of commercial programs, and in NASA's constant turf wars 
with other Federal commercial space operations (DoT, DoC, and others). NASA has completely 
bungled the relationship with industry vis-a-vis the Space Station. The only truly viable NASA 
commercial programs going on today are ACTS and some remote sensing work, although the 
latter is benefiting primarily from the declassification of DoD missions. Also, NASA is testing out 
some commercial use of TDRSS. NASA, by and large, thinks that "spin-offs" are commercial 
space, and the agency is more interested in protecting and administering its operational 
programs, rather than in fostering the development of a strong industry."




” DoD has learned that the commercial industry can be a true friend and a reliable 
supplier of high-tech solutions to DoD needs. After the Challenger disaster, DoD was effectively 
"forced" to rely upon the industry for ELVs, a policy which has been very successful. Also, 
almost in an accidental partnership, a DoD mission - GPS - has spawned a multi-billion dollar 
positioning industry. (Also, remember when the Internet was 'ARPANET?') DoD is interested in 
using space to complete its mission, which is military. Therefore, they view space as a "tool" not 
a "territory." Contrast this with NASA whose mission is space - and therefor, its "turf" is space! 
Thus, NASA has a "not-invented-here" syndrome, while DoD has a "hey-that’s-great-can-l-buy- 
some-to-complete-my-mission" mentality."
Events: Screen 1
1985: "Space Shuttles carry many attached small payloads into orbit."
1986: "Challenger disaster effectively cripples commercial space industry."
1987: " Resurgence of interest in small payloads, small launch vehicles."
1988: "Spaceport Florida created; OSC announces Pegasus project."
1989: "Spaceport concept spreads to other states (HI, VA, AK); Little LEOs started.”
1990: "DARPA buys its first Pegasus; small satellite programs funded by gov't.”
1991: "First Pegasus launched; Orbcomm-X launched (failed); Iridium announced."
1992: "Further Big LEO announcements; LLV bom; Taurus unveiled; WARC-92."
1993: "Teledesic announced; market becomes clearer for LEO services."
1994: "Orbcomm licensed; second round of Little LEOs nets five applicants.”
Events: Screen 3
1985: "Commercial space largely still a "dream," except for GEO communication satellites. ”
1986: "Challenger disaster effectively freezes all policy making.”
1987: ""No commercial use of shuttle" reinvigorates ELV industry; industry still reeling, 
however."
1988: "Industry doing "due diligence.""
1989: "Orbcomm, Pegasus, and other initiatives "heat up" the industry."
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1990: "Strong support of small satellites by DARPA.”
1991: "Big LEOs, backed by Big Companies, spur interest." 
1992: "WARC-92 clears the way for Big and Little LEOs." 
1993: "More and more people entering the fray."
1994: "Little LEOs licensed."
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Respondent 1-1-1
Question 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
1 9.9375 3.0625 2.5 7 4.5625 10.0625 8.062S 9.5 6 10
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 6.8125 8 7.875 7.9375 7.9375 8.4375 9.3125 10 9.3125 9.0625
4 8 7.875 8.3125 8.875 9.5 9.9375 9.9375 9.875 9.3125 8.375
5 5.125 4.9375 5.9375 6.875 7.5 7.4375 8.0625 8.9375 9.5 10.0625
6 6.875 7.375 7.9375 8.9375 7.875 8.5 8.5 8.9375 10 10.0625
7 9.875 9.875 8.9375 7.75 6.875 0.3125 6.125 5.6875 5.625 5.5625
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 9.9375 9.0625 5.5 5.5 6 6.375 6.5 6.5 6.75 6.875
10 9.9375 10 9.875 9.8125 9.9375 9.9375 9.9375 9.875 10 9.875
Data Sources:
Screen 1: "COMMERCIAL GEOSYNCHRONOUS COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES"
Screen Comments:
Screen 1: "WE D O N T HAVE DATA FOR THE CATEGORIES YOU REQUESTED"
Screen 2: "NOT AVAILABLE IN OUR DATA BASE. CONTACT DEPT OF TRANSP, OFFICE 
OF COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION 202-366-5770"
Screen 7: "CHALLENGER ACCIDENT IN 1986 HAD SIGNIFICANT IMPACT"
Screen 8: "HAVE NO IDEA"
Screen 9: "AFTER CHALLENGER ACCIDENT, POLICY TO RESTRICT COMMERCIAL 
PAYLOADS ON SHUTTLE HAD MAJOR IMPACT"
Screen 10: "DOD SUPPORT SEEMS TO BE RESTRICTED TO SUPPORTING A LAUNCH 
AND SATELLITE INDUSTRY THROUGH THEIR MILITARY CONTRACTS AND SUPPORT OF 
THE LAUNCH INFRASTRUCTURE. PROCUREMENT OF UFO SATELLITE BY NAVY A 
MAJOR CHANGE IN APPROACH. NASA’S RECENT AWARD OF TDRS CONTRACT AS A 
DELIVERY-ON-ORBIT ALSO SUPPORTIVE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE."
Summary Comments
"RESPONSES PROVIDED ON THE BASIS OF NOT BEING ATTRIBUTED TO XXXXXXX OR 
TO XXXXXX. MUCH OF THIS SURVEY DEALS IN PERCEPTIONS RATHER THAN 
QUANTITATIVE DATA."
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Question 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
1 0 1 1.25 2 2 3.0625 5.375 7.5 8.3125 8.5625
2 8 7.8125 7.3125 7 6.5 6.375 6.1875 6.3125 6.3125 6.125
3 0.6875 1.0625 2 2.0625 3.5625 3.8125 5.625 5.875 5.9375 6.9375
4 0.875 2.25 2.25 2.3125 7 7 7 8.0625 8.0625 8
5 3.625 3.625 4.875 4.8125 5.9375 8.5 8.5625 8.5 10.0625 10
6 4.1875 3.9375 5.5 5.5 7.875 7.8125 7.9375 10 10 10
7 9.8125 8.3125 7.5 6.5 6.0625 5.5625 4.8125 4.75 4.75 4.0625
8 9.625 8.5 7.6875 8.5 8.4375 8.625 8.375 7.5625 7.5625 6.5625
g 0.6875 0.5625 0.5625 1.0625 1.25 1.5625 1.5 1.9375 2.0625 2
10 1.9375 1.9375 2.5625 2.5 3 4 4.0625 4.0625 4.5 4.5625
Summary Comments
"My responses are not data based but are based on perspectives and impressions from working 
in the aerospace arena since 1979. I am more familiar with NASA programs than those of DOD 
and I am sure that this is reflected in my responses."
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Factor No. 1: Launch Activity
'85 - ‘86: There is disagreement in the data. Two respondents indicated a precipitous 
decrease while the others indicated a small increase. Ancillary data supports the 
decrease due to the Challenger accident in 1986. Prior to Challenger, the space shuttle 
earned many small to mid-sized payloads to orbit. The other data were unsubstantiated.
‘86 - ‘87: There was a consensus on a modest decline. No outliers.
‘87 - '88: There was consensus on a modest increase, with one outlier suggesting a 
large increase. Comments made by the outlier indicated that the response was based 
solely on geosynchronous communications satellites. The level of increase would be 
inaccurate since this type represents only a small portion of the total launch activity. The 
response was discarded.
‘88 - '89: There was no consensus. One substantial increase was indicated, as well as a 
substantial decrease. The decrease was from the same outlier as noted for ‘87 - ‘88. The 
increase was based on commercial launch activity only, and probably overstated. Since they 
nearly offset, both were retained.
‘89 - ‘90: There was a consensus on a substantial increase. Comments indicate that small 
satellite launches started being funded by the government. One outlier may overstate the 
increase somewhat, but no evidence existed for its deletion.
‘90 - ‘91: There was no consensus. One substantial increase was indicated, as well as a 
substantial decrease. Both were retained.
‘91 - ‘92: There was no consensus, and no outliers. No evidence for deletion of any responses.
'92 - '93: There was no consensus. There was one large positive outlier, and one fairly large 
negative. No evidence was given to refute either, so both were retained.
'93 - '94: There was no consensus. There was one positive and one negative outlier. The 
positive one was based on only part of the market. The negative one had no supporting data. 
Both were retained.
Factor No. 2: Launch Costs 
'85 - '86: Consensus on slight decline. No outliers. 
'86 - '87: Consensus on slight decline. No outliers. 
'87 -'88 : No consensus. No outliers.
‘88 - ‘89: No consensus. No outliers.
‘89 - ‘90: Consensus on slight increase. No outliers.
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‘90 - '91: No consensus. No outliers.
‘91 - ‘92: Consensus on slight increase. No outliers.
'92 • '93: No consensus. No outliers.
‘93 - ‘94: Consensus on slight increase. No outliers.
Factor No. 3: Leoal/Reaulatorv Environment 
'85 - ‘86: No consensus. No outliers.
‘86 - ‘87: No consensus. One positive outlier, substantiated by ancillary data which identified the 
unfreezing of policy making which was curtailed following Challenger. The response was 
retained.
‘87 • ‘88: Consensus on slight increase. No outliers.
'88 • ‘89: No consensus. One highly positive outlier, with the comment that data is based on 
personal observation. The data indicate that this was the first year for which the respondent had 
information or knowledge, and all prior years were entered as zero. The response was 
discarded, since it did not represent a change in the factor.
‘89 - '90: Consensus on slight increase. No outliers.
‘90 - '91: Consensus on increase. No outliers.
‘91 - ‘92: No consensus. No outliers.
‘92 - '93: No consensus. No outliers.
‘93 - '94: No consensus. No outliers.
Factor No. 4: Support of Federal Administration 
'85 - '86: No consensus. No outliers.
'86 • ‘87: Consensus on slight increase. No outliers.
‘87 - ‘88: Consensus on slight increase. No outliers.
'88 - ‘89: No consensus. One positive outlier, with no evidence to confirm or deny. Response is 
retained.
'89 - ‘90: Consensus on increase, with one positive outlier. The data indicate that this was the 
first year for which the respondent had information or knowledge, and all prior years were 
entered as zero. The response was discarded, since it did not represent a change in the factor.
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'90 • '91: No consensus. No outliers.
‘91 - ‘92: No consensus. No outliers.
'92 - ‘93: No consensus. No outliers.
‘93 - ‘94: No consensus. One negative outlier, with no evidence to confirm or deny. Response 
is retained.
Factor No. 5: Competition
‘85 - '86: Consensus on slight decrease. No outliers.
‘86 - '87: Consensus on increase. No outliers.
'87 - ‘88: No consensus. No outliers.
‘88 - ‘89: Consensus on substantial increase. No outliers.
‘89 - ‘90: Consensus on substantial increase, with one positive outlier. The data indicate that 
this was the first year for which the respondent had information or knowledge, and all prior years 
were entered as zero. The response was discarded, since it did not represent a change in the 
factor.
‘90 - '91: Consensus on substantial increase. No outliers.
'91 - ‘92: No consensus. No outliers.
‘92 - ‘93: No consensus, one positive outlier. Associated comment indicated that data were a 
result of market studies. Response retained.
‘93 - ‘94: No consensus. No outliers.
Factor No. 6: New Technology Introduction 
‘85 - '86: No consensus. No outliers.
'8 6 - ‘87: Consensus on increase. No outliers.
‘87 - ‘88: Consensus on increase. No outliers.
'88 - ‘89: Consensus on substantial increase, with two positive outliers. Ancillary information for 
one designated introduction of Pegasus launch vehicle as a leap in technology. It was retained. 
For the other, the data indicate that this was the first year for which the respondent had 
information or knowledge, and all prior years were entered as zero. The response was 
discarded, since it did not represent a change in the factor.
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Factor No. 6: New Technology Introduction (Cont’d.)
‘89 • *90: No consensus. One negative outlier, with no evidence to confirm or deny. Response 
is retained.
*90 - '91: Consensus on increase. No outliers.
'91 - *92: Consensus on increase. No outliers.
‘92 - '93: No consensus. No outliers.
'93 - '94: Consensus on increase. No outliers.
Factor No. 7: Public Support
‘85 - '86: No Consensus. One positive and one negative outlier, neither with confirming or 
denying data. Both responses retained.
‘86 - '87: Consensus on decrease. No outliers.
'87 - ‘88: Consensus on decrease. No outliers.
‘88 - ‘89: Consensus on decrease. No outliers.
'89 - ‘90: Consensus on decrease. No outliers.
'9 0 - ‘91: Consensus on decrease. No outliers.
'91 - ‘92: Consensus on decrease. No outliers.
‘92 - ‘93: Consensus on decrease. No outliers.
'93 - '94: No consensus. No outliers.
Factor No. 8: Academic Research
‘85 - ‘86: Consensus on decrease, with one negative outlier. Comment stated that research 
suffered drastically as a result of Challenger. Response retained.
‘86 - ‘87: No consensus. No outliers.
•87 - ‘88: No consensus. No outliers.
•88 - '89: No consensus. No outliers.
‘89 - '90: Consensus on increase. No outliers.
‘9 0 -'9 1 : No consensus. No outliers.
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‘91 - ‘92: No consensus. No outliers.
‘9 2 - ‘93: No consensus. No outliers.
‘93 - ‘94: Consensus on decrease. No outliers.
Factor No. 9: NASA Support
‘85 • ‘86: No consensus. One negative outlier, supported by comment that NASA has always
disdained the commercial space industry. One positive outlier, with no confirming of denying
data. Both responses retained.
'86 - ‘87: No consensus. One negative outlier, supported by comment that Challenger had a 
deleterious effect.
‘87 - ‘88: No consensus. No outliers.
‘88 - '89: No consensus. No outliers.
'89 - '90: No consensus. No outliers.
‘90 - ‘91: No consensus. One negative outlier supported by identification of NASA’s 
reorganization and cutbacks in funding for CCDS’s.
‘91 - ‘92: No consensus. No outliers.
‘92 - ‘93: No consensus. No outliers.
'93 - '94: No consensus. One negative outlier, with no confirming or denying data. Response is 
retained.
Factor No. 10: DoD Support 
‘8 5 - ‘86: No consensus. No outliers.
‘86 - ‘87: No consensus. No outliers.
‘8 7 - ‘88: No consensus. No outliers.
'88 - '89: Consensus on increase. No outliers.
'89 - '90: No consensus. No outliers.
'90 - '91: No consensus. No outliers.
'91 - ‘92: Consensus on increase. No outliers.
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'92 - ‘93: Consensus on increase. One positive outlier supported by comment that declining 
DoD budgets have caused strong support of commercial space as a source of revenue.
‘93 - ‘94: Consensus on increase, with two positive outliers. One cites the same rationale as for 
'92 • ‘93. The other is supported by comment that post-cold war climate has altered DoD's 
viewpoint. Both responses retained.
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Phase Plane: NASA Support vs. Launch Activity (Filtered Data)
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Phase Plane: DoD Support vs. Launch Activity (Filtered Data)
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Phase Plane: Legal/Reg. Environ, vs. Launch Cost (Filtered Data)
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Phase Plane: Competition vs. Launch Cost (Filtered Data)
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Phase Plane: New Technology vs. Launch Cost (Filtered Data)
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Phase Plane: DoD Support vs. Launch Cost (Filtered Data)
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Phase Plane: Competition vs. Legal/Reg. Environ. (Filtered Data)
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Phase Plane: Public Support vs. Legal/Reg. Environ. (Filtered Data)
2 1
3 4
■c a>o>o cQ_ COQ_ J-3
CO O
o cis <D.Q O3 k.
Q_ <DCL



























































<  •*= 
CO o


















































Phase Plane: Competition vs. Fed. Admin. Support (Filtered Data)
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Phase Plane: NASA Support vs. Fed. Admin. Support (Filtered Data)
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Phase Plane: DoD Support vs. Public Support (Filtered Data)
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Phase Plane: DoD Support vs. NASA Support (Filtered Data)
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APPENDIX G
PHASE PLANE ANALYSIS DATA
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Analysis o F P tase Planes
Periodicity Projected Behavior
Factor Pair Trajectory by Quadrant Prior Four Last Four Rsrchr. ResP1 ResiP2 ResP3 Resip 4
1 Launch Cost VS. Launch Activity 3 3 4 4 1 1 1 1 2 8 2 OUT 1 OUT 1 OUT 2 a m ­ 1 OUT 1
2 Legal/Regulatory Environ. VS. Launch Activity 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 3 2 6 IN 2 OUT 2 OUT 2 our 4 OUT 4
3 Fed. Admin. Support vs. Launch Activity 2 2 1 1 1 4 1 4 3 2 8 OUT 3 OUT 3 OUT 3 OUT 4 OUT 4
4 Competition vs. Launch Activity 2 2 1 1 1 1 4 1 2 2 8 IN 4 OUT 1 OUT 3 IN 1 IN 3
5 New Technology vs. Launch Activity 2 2 1 1 4 1 1 1 2 8 2 OUT 1 OUT 2 OUT 2 OUT 1 OUT 1
6 Public Support vs. Launch Activity 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 OUT 3 OUT 3 OUT 3 OUT 4 OUT 1
7 Academic Research vs. Launch Activity 3 3 1 4 1 4 4 4 3 8 2 OUT 3 OUT 3 OUT 3 IN 4 OUT 4
8 NASA Support vs. Launch Activity 3 3 1 1 4 4 4 4 3 8 2 OUT 4 OUT 3 OUT 3 IN 4 OUT 4
9 DoO Support vs. Launch Activity 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 OUT 2 OUT 2 IN 2 IN 1 IN 1
10 Legal/Regulatory Environ. vs. Launch Cost 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 4 4 2 2 IN 1 IN 1 IN 1 IN 4 IN 1
11 Fed. Admin. Support vs. Launch Cost 2 2 2 2 1 4 1 4 4 2 8 OUT 4 OUT 4 OUT 4 IN 4 IN 1
12 Competition vs. Launch Cost 3 2 2 2 1 1 4 1 1 2 8 OUT 1 OUT 1 OUT 4 OUT 1 OUT 1
13 New Technology vs. Launch Cost 2 2 2 2 4 1 1 1 1 2 1 OUT 1 IN 4 OUT 1 OUT 1 OUT 1
14 Public Support vs. Launch Cost 3 3 3 3 2 1 OUT 4 OUT 4 OUT 1 IN 4 OUT 4
15 Academic Research vs. Launch Cost 3 3 2 3 1 4 4 4 4 8 1 OUT 4 OUT 4 OUT 4 OUT 4 OUT 4
16 NASA Support vs. Launch Cost 3 3 2 2 8 1 OUT 4 OUT 4 OUT 4 IN 4 OUT 4
17 DoD Support vs. Launch Cost 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 OUT 1 IN 1 OUT 1 OUT 1 OUT 1
18 Fed. Admin. Support vs. Legal/Regulatory Environ. 1 1 1 1 1 4 1 3 3 1 8 IN 4 IN 3 OUT 3 IN 3 IN 2
19 Competition vs. Legal/Regulatory Environ. 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 2 2 1 8 IN 3 OUT 2 OUT 2 OUT 2 OUT 2
20 New Technology vs. Legal/Regulatory Environ. 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 2 2 2 2 OUT 1 OUT 2 IN 2 OUT 1 IN 2
21 Public Support vs. Legal/Regulatory Environ. 3 3 1 2 IN 3 OUT 3 IN 3 OUT 3 IN 3
22 Academic Research vs. Legal/Regulatory Environ. 4 4 1 4 1 4 4 3 3 2 2 OUT 4 IN 2 IN 4 IN 4 IN 4
23 NASA Support vs. Legal/Regulatory Environ. 4 4 1 1 4 4 4 3 3 2 2 OUT 4 IN 2 IN 4 IN 4 IN 3
24 DoO Support vs. Lfgal/Reguiatory Environ. 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 OUT 2 IN 2 OUT 1 IN 2 IN 2
25 Competition vs. Fed. Admin. Support 4 1 1 1 1 2 4 2 2 1 2 OUT 3 IN 3 OUT 2 IN 3 OUT 2
26 New Technology vs. Fed. Admin. Support 1 1 1 1 4 2 1 2 2 2 2 OUT 2 OUT 2 OUT 2 IN 2 OUT 2
27 Public Support vs. Fed. Admin. Support 3 4 3 3 1 2 OUT 3 IN 3 OUT 3 IN 3 IN 4
28 Academic Research vs. Fed. Admin. Support 4 4 1 4 1 3 4 3 3 2 2 OUT 3 OUT 3 IN 3 IN 3 OUT 3
29 NASA Support vs. Fed. Admin. Support 4 4 1 1 4 3 4 3 3 2 2 OUT 3 IN 3 IN 3 IN 3 IN 3
30 DoD Support vs. Fed. Admin. Support 4 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 OUT 2 OUT 2 OUT 2 OUT 2 IN 2
31 New Technology vs. Competition 2 1 1 1 4 1 2 1 1 2 2 IN 1 OUT 4 OUT 1 OUT 1 OUT 1


















Anal}rsis 01 Phase 3lanes
Periodicity Projected Behavior
Factor Pair Trajectoiy by Quadrant Prior Four Last Four Rsrchr. Res P 1 Res p2 ResP3 ResP 4
33 Academic Research vs. Competition 3 4 1 4 1 4 3 4 4 2 2 OUT 4 OUT 4 OUT 4 OUT 4 OUT 4
34 NASA Support vs. Competition 3 4 1 1 4 4 3 4 4 2 2 IN 3 OUT 4 OUT 4 OUT 4 OUT 4
35 DoDSupport vs. Competition 3 1 i 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 OUT 1 OUT 1 OUT 1 OUT 1 OUT 1
36 Public Support vs. New Technology 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 2 1 IN 4 OUT 4 OUT 4 OUT 4 OUT 4
37 Academic Research vs. New Technology 4 4 1 4 2 4 4 4 4 8 1 OUT 4 OUT 1 OUT 4 OUT 4 OUT 4
38 NASA Support vs. New Technology 4 4 1 1 3 4 4 4 4 6 1 OUT 4 OUT 4 OUT 4 OUT 4 OUT 4
39 DoD Support vs. New Technology 4 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 OUT 1 OUT 1 OUT 1 OUT 1 IN 1
40 Academic Research vs. Public Support 3 3 2 3 1 3 3 3 3 8 1 OUT 3 OUT 2 OUT 3 IN 3 IN 3
41 NASA Support vs. Public Support 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 1 OUT 3 OUT 3 OUT 2 IN 3 IN 3
42 DoD Support vs. Public Support 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 OUT 2 OUT 2 OUT 2 OUT 2 IN 2
43 NASA Support vs. Academic Research 3 3 1 2 4 3 3 3 3 4 1 OUT 3 OUT 3 OUT 3 OUT 3 IN 3
44 DoD Support vs. Academic Research 3 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 OUT 2 OUT 2 OUT 2 OUT 2 IN 2
45 DoO Support vs. NASA Support 3 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 OUT 2 OUT 2 OUT 2 IN 2 IN 2
214
APPENDIX H 
SYSTEM UNCERTAINTY INDEX CHARTS FOR INDIVIDUAL FACTORS
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
216
System Uncertainty Index 
Factor 1: Launch A ctiv ity
System Uncertainty Index 
Factor 2: Launch Coat
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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System Uncertainty Index 
Factor 3: Legal/Regulatory Environm ent
System Uncertainty Index 
Factor 4: Support o f Federal A dm in istra tion
Yaar-Pilr
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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System Uncertainty Index 
Factor 6: Laval o f C om petition
System Uncertainty Index 
F a c to rt: New Technology In troduction
w n  ee/t7 nm w w  w ao  aom  a im  aa/n  aj»4
Yaar-Pair
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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System Uncertainty Index 
Factor 7: Public Support
w/w mm mm mm mm mm mm mm n u
Y ur-P a lr
System Uncertainty Index 
Factor 8: Level o f Academic Research
Yesr-Pslr
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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System Uncertainty Index 
Factor 9: Laval o f NASA Support
wm wv nrm m  w«o wm nm •w/o VJ04
Y M r-fa Ir
System Uncertainty Index 
Factor 10: Laval o f DoD Support
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
APPENDIX I 
PHASE PLANE DIAGRAMS W ITH “NEXT P O IN T  PROJECTIONS
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Public Support/DoD Support Phase Plane With “Next Point” Projections
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